Trading in the Presence of Short-Lived Private Information: Evidence from Analyst Recommendation Changes by Kadan, Ohad et al.
Cornell University School of Hotel Administration
The Scholarly Commons
Articles and Chapters School of Hotel Administration Collection
5-24-2017
Trading in the Presence of Short-Lived Private
Information: Evidence from Analyst
Recommendation Changes
Ohad Kadan
Washington University
Roni Michaely
Cornell University
Pamela Moulton
Cornell University School of Hotel Administration, pm388@cornell.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.sha.cornell.edu/articles
Part of the Finance and Financial Management Commons
This Article or Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Hotel Administration Collection at The Scholarly Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Articles and Chapters by an authorized administrator of The Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
hlmdigital@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kadan, O., Michaely, R., & Moulton, P. C. (2017). Trading in the presence of short-lived private information: Evidence from analyst
recommendation changes [Electronic version]. Retrieved [insert date], from Cornell University, School of Hotel Administration site:
http://scholarship.sha.cornell.edu/articles/1009/
Trading in the Presence of Short-Lived Private Information: Evidence from
Analyst Recommendation Changes
Abstract
We use a proprietary dataset to test the implications of several asymmetric information models on how short-
lived private information affects trading strategies and liquidity provision. Our identification rests on
information acquisition before analyst recommendations are publically announced. We provide the first
empirical evidence supporting theoretical predictions that early-informed traders “sell the news” after “buying
the rumor.” Further, we find distinct profit-taking patterns across different classes of institutions. Uninformed
institutions, but not individuals, emerge as de-facto liquidity providers to better-informed institutions.
Placebo tests confirm that these trading patterns are unique to situations in which some investors have a short-
lived informational advantage.
Keywords
private information, analyst recommendations, institutional trading, individual trading
Disciplines
Finance and Financial Management
Comments
Required Publisher Statement
© Michael G. Foster School of Business, University of Washington 2017. Final version forthcoming as: Kadan,
O., Michaely, R., & Moulton, P. C. (2017). Trading in the presence of short-lived private information:
Evidence from analyst recommendation changes. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis. Reprinted with
permission. All rights reserved.
This article or chapter is available at The Scholarly Commons: http://scholarship.sha.cornell.edu/articles/1009
     
Trading in the Presence of Short-Lived Private Information: 
Evidence from Analyst Recommendation Changes  
Ohad Kadan 
Roni Michaely 
Pamela C. Moulton* 
 
May 24, 2017 
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, forthcoming 
 
Abstract 
 
We use a proprietary dataset to test the implications of several asymmetric information 
models on how short-lived private information affects trading strategies and liquidity provision. 
Our identification rests on information acquisition before analyst recommendations are publically 
announced. We provide the first empirical evidence supporting theoretical predictions that early-
informed traders “sell the news” after “buying the rumor.” Further, we find distinct profit-taking 
patterns across different classes of institutions. Uninformed institutions, but not individuals, 
emerge as de-facto liquidity providers to better-informed institutions. Placebo tests confirm that 
these trading patterns are unique to situations in which some investors have a short-lived 
informational advantage.  
 
 
 
* Kadan is at the Olin Business School, Washington University in St. Louis (kadan@wustl.edu); Michaely is at 
Johnson@Cornell Tech, SC Johnson College of Business, Cornell University (rm34@cornell.edu); and Moulton is 
at the School of Hotel Administration, SC Johnson College of Business, Cornell University (pmoulton@cornell.edu). 
We thank an anonymous referee, Yakov Amihud, David Brown, Markus Brunnermeier, Bidisha Chakrabarty, 
Jennifer Conrad (the editor), Ryan Davies, Thierry Foucault, Larry Glosten, Itay Goldstein, Michael Goldstein, Terry 
Hendershott, Jeff Hu, Paul Irvine, Pankaj Jain, Russell Jame, Ron Kaniel, Andrew Karolyi, Marc Lipson, Roger Loh, 
Tom McInish, Elizabeth Odders-White, Napoleon Overton, Mark Ready, Matt Ringgenberg, Gideon Saar, Eric Sirri, 
David Smith, Elvira Sojli, Avanidhar Subrahmanyam, Sheridan Titman, Ruslan Tuneshev, and seminar participants 
at Babson College, Cornell University, Fordham University, Singapore Management University, Tsinghua 
University, University of Adelaide, University at Albany, University of Lugano, University of Memphis, University 
of Wisconsin at Madison, the 2013 IDC Summer Conference, the 2014 EFA meeting, the 2014 FMA meeting, the 
2014 Multinational Finance Society symposium, and the UC Davis 2014 workshop on information and asset prices 
for helpful comments. We thank the New York Stock Exchange for providing data, Leonardo Madureira for sharing 
data with us, and Chris Vincent and Kate Volkova for research assistance. 
  
     
Trading in the Presence of Short-Lived Private Information:  
Evidence from Analyst Recommendation Changes  
 
Abstract 
We use a proprietary dataset to test the implications of several asymmetric information models on 
how short-lived private information affects trading strategies and liquidity provision. Our 
identification rests on information acquisition before analyst recommendations are publically 
announced. We provide the first empirical evidence supporting theoretical predictions that early-
informed traders “sell the news” after “buying the rumor.” Further, we find distinct profit-taking 
patterns across different classes of institutions. Uninformed institutions, but not individuals, 
emerge as de-facto liquidity providers to better-informed institutions. Placebo tests confirm that 
these trading patterns are unique to situations in which some investors have a short-lived 
informational advantage. 
 
JEL classification: G14, G18, G23, G24 
Keywords: Private information, analyst recommendations, institutional trading, individual trading 
     
  1 
1. Introduction 
In today’s financial markets, active portfolio managers continuously pursue informational 
advantages. Much of the asset management industry is focused on generating proprietary 
informational signals and then quickly exploiting these signals through trade. In this competitive 
and fast-paced environment, even a short-lived informational advantage may constitute a 
meaningful edge. How do informed traders benefit from such short-lived private information? A 
Wall Street adage suggests that professional investors often follow a “buy the rumor and sell the 
news” strategy.1 That is, if an investor possesses a private, short-lived positive informational signal 
about an asset, she will buy the asset when the information is private and then sell it when the 
signal is revealed publically, reaping short-term profits.  
While there is some anecdotal evidence supporting this “buy the rumor and sell the news” 
strategy, it is not clear, a priori, whether some investors are able to obtain this type of informational 
advantage or whether such a strategy would necessarily be optimal. There is virtually no formal 
evidence on the extent to which this strategy is used and by whom. While buying early on an 
informative signal is obvious, the strategy for taking profits and benefiting from the information 
rents is not entirely clear. Perhaps a trader should take profits immediately upon the broad release 
of information, or perhaps the signal has long-term implications (i.e., prices do not fully reflect the 
information immediately), inducing early-informed traders to hold on to the asset, benefitting from 
the long-term drift. Different types of early-informed traders may take profits at different times 
depending on the speed with which information is incorporated into prices, the trader’s investment 
horizon, the nature of the information she holds, and her attitude toward risk. Some of these factors 
are considered theoretically in Hirshleifer, Subrahmanyam, and Titman (1994) and Brunnermeier 
                                                            
1 The term “rumor” is interpreted broadly to include any information obtained before it is publicly announced, including very 
accurate information.    
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(2005). Also intriguing is the fact that if some traders are following the “buy the rumor, sell the 
news” strategy to profit from their private signals, then other traders must be following a mirror-
image strategy, suffering losses during informational events due to adverse selection. Who are 
these traders?  
In this paper we exploit the unusual richness of a proprietary database to reveal the inner 
workings of trading in the face of short-lived private information, exploiting a unique setting in 
which short-lived differences in information are plausible. Consistent with Hirshleifer et al. (1994) 
and Brunnermeier (2005), we first show that, on average, investors who are likely to possess short-
lived private information indeed buy the rumor and sell the news. Interestingly, when we go 
beyond existing theory to document the trading strategies of different classes of informed traders, 
we find that they differ in their profit-taking patterns, reflecting variations in their trading horizons 
and motives. While “buying the rumor” is pervasive among early-informed traders, the “selling 
the news” portion of the strategy is used by only a subset of early-informed traders. We are able 
to characterize the type of traders that are more likely to both “buy the rumor” and “sell the news” 
and those that only “buy the rumor.” We also study the trading strategies of uninformed traders 
and investigate how the market is cleared, shedding new light on liquidity provision and the 
inevitable adverse selection associated with information differences. Finally, our setting allows us 
to quantify the informational rents by estimating the monetary value of a short-lived informational 
advantage.  
To examine short-lived differences in information, we focus on sell-side analyst 
recommendation changes as times when information varies across investor classes because either 
(i) brokerages share information about their analysts’ recommendations early with their 
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institutional clients;2 or (ii) institutional investors do their own research and reach similar 
conclusions before analysts release their recommendations. Thus, the few days before analyst 
recommendation changes serve as a period during which institutions that are attentive to firm-
specific news have an informational advantage compared to other traders. We use this setting to 
study how the trading patterns of different players vary with their information.  
Our analysis is made possible by a proprietary dataset that identifies daily buy and sell 
volumes of all institutions, individuals, and market makers on the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE), including several useful sub-categories. Within institutional trades, the dataset separately 
identifies program trades, which are orders to trade baskets of multiple stocks. Program trading is 
not motivated by news about one particular stock, and we use this feature to separate program 
institutional trades from the “news-driven” institutional trading that is more likely to have private 
information in advance of analyst recommendation changes. Within news-driven institutional 
trades the dataset further identifies proprietary trades, in which NYSE member firms trade for their 
own account, and agency trades, in which member firms enter orders for their customers.3 Within 
program institutional trades the dataset identifies trades as either index-arbitrage or non-index-
arbitrage. Because the dataset includes the trades of all participants on the NYSE and there is a 
natural “adding-up constraint” (i.e., there is a buyer for every seller), we can also determine who 
loses when some traders profit.  
                                                            
2 Papers documenting evidence consistent with early information leakage around analyst recommendations include Irvine, Lipson, 
and Puckett (2007), Goldstein, Irvine, Kandel, and Wiener (2009), Juergens and Lindsey (2009), Christophe, Ferri, and Hsieh 
(2010), and Busse, Green, and Jegadeesh (2012). The practice of brokerages providing early information about their 
recommendations to their clients does not appear to be illegal during our sample period. See Section 2.2 for a detailed discussion.  
3 The NYSE designates as “proprietary” all trades made by member firms for their own account, and it designates as “agency” 
all trades for member firms’ customers, which would include those customers’ own proprietary trades. Consequently, any 
differences we find between the trades of proprietary and agency trades are, in fact, a lower bound on the actual differences. See 
Section 2.1 for more details. 
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The Hirshleifer et al. (1994) and Brunnermeier (2005) models provide useful guidance for 
our empirical analysis. They predict that early-informed investors will buy stocks prior to positive 
information releases and reverse their positions when the information is released publicly. 
Hirshleifer et al. (1994) also predict that late-informed investors will trade in the direction of the 
information when it is released more broadly, but not before. Both models predict that early-
informed investors’ trading will be greater for information events with larger price changes on the 
day the information is made public. While our results are generally supportive of these predictions, 
the richness of our dataset allows us to go beyond the level of detail in the theories.  
We find that news-driven institutions (the early-informed group) buy into a stock before it 
is upgraded, reflecting a “buy the rumor” strategy. This behavior applies to both agency and 
proprietary trades, showing that both types of news-driven institutional traders possess an 
informational edge. Moreover, as predicted by the theories, during the days preceding analyst 
upgrades these institutions buy more of stocks that subsequently have bigger announcement-day 
price increases. But we observe a striking difference between proprietary and agency traders’ 
profit-taking practices. Proprietary traders sell more than 50% of their initial stake immediately 
upon an upgrade announcement (and reverse more than 80% of their positions on downgrade 
announcements), whereas agency traders defer their profit-taking. Thus, while “buying the rumor” 
applies to all news-driven institutions, the “sell the news” phenomenon is attributable solely to 
proprietary trades. This behavior serves as a strong indication of divergence in trading motives and 
horizons among institutions. Proprietary trades appear to be more speculative and short-term 
oriented, reflected in institutions’ realizing short-term profits by reversing their initial positions 
swiftly. In contrast, agency trades appear to have a longer horizon, as we do not observe short-
term reversals in these trades. These findings are particularly relevant in light of the Volcker Rule 
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(introduced in 2010 and implemented in 2014), which restricts the ability of banks to engage in 
speculative short-term proprietary trades. Our results provide the first formal academic evidence 
on the speculative nature of proprietary trades and how they deviate from more traditional 
investment activities.  
The economic magnitude of the trading profits associated with information asymmetries is 
large. During our 1999-2010 sample period, we estimate that the average return earned by 
proprietary traders from buying the rumor four days before an analyst upgrade and selling the news 
on the upgrade day, and executing the mirror-image strategy around analyst downgrades, is 1.71% 
per event. For proprietary traders who use leverage, the effective returns would be even larger.  
Examining the behavior of individual investors (the late-informed group), we find no 
abnormal buying prior to upgrades (nor selling prior to downgrades), in line with the theoretical 
predictions. Furthermore, we find significant net buying by individuals on the day of the upgrades, 
consistent with the theoretical predictions. We do not find significant individual selling on the day 
of downgrades. This behavior is consistent with Barber and Odean (2008), who argue that 
individuals tend to buy (but not sell) attention-grabbing stocks. 
In terms of market clearing, two groups of traders can potentially serve the role of providing 
liquidity to the early-informed news-driven institutions: market makers and program traders (non-
news-driven institutions).4 While market makers have the formal role of providing liquidity, 
program institutional traders are also in a natural position to serve this role since they trade large 
baskets of securities and are not attentive to firm-specific news, leaving their orders susceptible to 
being adversely selected by executing against informed orders.5 Empirically, we find that program 
                                                            
4 Individuals could also provide liquidity, but during our study period individuals represent less than 2% of total trading volume 
and thus cannot realistically provide enough liquidity to meet the demands of news-driven institutions, who represent over 60% 
of trading volume.  
5 Such a “winner’s curse” scenario resembles Rock (1986), in which uninformed orders to buy initial public offering (IPO) shares 
are more likely to get executed when informed traders withdraw from the market, implying that the IPO is a “lemon.” 
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traders, but not market makers, are on the other side of the news-driven institutional trades at the 
daily level.6 Thus, program traders (more specifically, those that are not engaged in index 
arbitrage) emerge as de-facto liquidity providers to news-driven institutional investors.  
To verify that our results are indeed driven by some market participants having information 
before others, and not more general trading patterns unrelated to early information acquisition, we 
conduct three placebo tests. Analyses of analyst reiterations of previous recommendations (which 
prior evidence suggests do not carry much information), earnings announcements (when firms are 
prohibited from sharing information early), and days with similar-magnitude returns but no 
recommendation changes (to capture other price-moving events that are less likely to involve 
information leakage) all reveal trading patterns that differ dramatically from those in our main 
tests, supporting the interpretation that short-lived informational advantages drive our main results.  
Our findings offer an inside look at how different types of investors trade in the face of 
asymmetric information. The rich dataset and the setting around analyst recommendation changes 
allow us to document the behavior of all the players, including informed traders, uninformed 
traders, and liquidity providers. We provide the first formal piece of empirical evidence confirming 
the considerable anecdotal evidence of “buy the rumor, sell the news” trading strategies. We also 
provide the first empirical evidence on the divergence in horizons and motives between 
institutional proprietary and agency trades. Our analysis further reveals a previously unexplored 
feature of program trades, who turn out to be the “victims” of adverse selection due to their lack 
of attention to firm-specific news. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the different 
types of traders in detail, review the theoretical background, and develop our empirical predictions. 
                                                            
6 It may be that market makers provide liquidity intraday but then reduce their positions by the end of the day to manage their 
overnight inventory risk; our daily-level dataset does not allow us to observe such intraday dynamics.  
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Section 3 describes our sample and data. Section 4 presents our main results. Section 5 presents 
the results of placebo tests. Section 6 details robustness checks, and Section 7 concludes. 
2. Empirical Strategy and Predictions 
Our goal is to study how different types of investors trade when facing short-term 
information asymmetry. Our empirical strategy is guided by considering the institutional features 
of different types of traders in our dataset. For some of the analysis we can invoke existing 
theoretical models of investor behavior with short-lived informational differences. We next discuss 
the types of traders considered in our analysis and review the relevant theoretical background. We 
then combine these discussions into workable predictions for our empirical analysis.  
2.1. Trader Types and Features 
At the highest level, the NYSE dataset identifies trading by institutions, individuals, and 
market makers. Since the dataset is comprehensive, the daily buy-sell trade imbalances of these 
three groups always add up to zero, a property which we refer to as the adding-up constraint. 
Institutional trading includes both news-driven institutions (such as actively managed mutual funds 
and hedge funds) and non-news-driven institutions in the form of program traders. News-driven 
institutional trades are further divided into proprietary and agency trades, and program institutional 
trades are further divided into index-arbitrage and non-index-arbitrage trades. The distinctions 
between these different types of institutional trades play an important role in our analysis, and we 
next elaborate on the key aspects of each of the categories.  
2.1.1. News-driven institutional: proprietary and agency. The NYSE dataset divides news-
driven institutional trades between proprietary trades (for a member firm’s own account) and 
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agency trades (on behalf of a member firm’s clients).7 During our sample period (1999-2010), 
many investment banks employed traders who were solely dedicated to proprietary trading in an 
attempt to boost the banks’ profits. These proprietary desks functioned like internal hedge funds, 
operating as separate entities within the bank. Their trades were known to be speculative in nature 
and often accounted for significant portions of investment banks’ profits and losses during our 
study period.8 The Volcker rule, proposed in 2010 as an addition to the Dodd-Frank Act and 
implemented in 2014, was an explicit attempt to curb financial institutions’ speculative proprietary 
trading. Of specific interest to the regulator was the short-term horizon of proprietary trading, 
which was viewed as an activity that may destabilize depository institutions. Indeed, the rule views 
proprietary trading in the context of trading accounts defined as “[…] any account used for 
acquiring or taking positions in the securities and instruments […] for the purpose of selling in 
the near term (or otherwise with the intent to resell in order to profit from short-term price 
movements) […]” (Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Section 619). 
In contrast, agency trades include trades for clients with typically long-term investment horizons, 
so agency trades in aggregate are less likely to reflect short-term speculative strategies. Thus, while 
both proprietary and agency traders may have similar sources of information, the trading motives 
and horizons of these two types of traders differ. We are not aware of prior academic research 
documenting the differences between agency and proprietary trades, likely due to the lack of 
appropriate data. 
2.1.2. Program institutional trades: index-arbitrage and non-index-arbitrage. The NYSE 
defines program trades as baskets of at least 15 securities valued at $1 million or more. Program 
                                                            
7 Member firms owned seats on the NYSE until the NYSE went public in 2006, after which seats were replaced by trading 
licenses. 
8 See for example “Investment Banks’ Superstar Proprietary Traders: Where Are They Now?” by Julia La Roche, Business 
Insider, August 19, 2011.  
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trades are used to efficiently execute trades in multiple securities at once and are generally not 
driven by news about a specific security. The NYSE database further categorizes program trades 
as index-arbitrage or non-index-arbitrage. Index arbitrage traders take offsetting positions in index 
stocks and futures to profit from small mis-pricings between the cash and futures markets. Non-
index-arbitrage program trades are often used by asset managers such as Exchange Traded Funds 
(ETFs), who view program trades as a way to increase efficiency and reduce costs.9 By trading 
baskets of stocks irrespective of firm-specific news, program traders expose themselves to being 
adversely selected by being on the “wrong side” in situations where other traders possess superior 
information about a firm. In fact, Hendershott and Seasholes (2009) find that non-index-arbitrage 
program traders lose money in aggregate.  
2.1.3. Individuals. All non-institutional trades are in this category. Individuals are unlikely to be 
directly in touch with sell-side analysts, and they typically rely on public sources of information. 
The trading patterns of individuals have been studied in papers such as Barber and Odean (2008), 
Odean (1998), and Kaniel, Saar, and Titman (2008). Nevertheless, we are not aware of prior studies 
documenting individual behavior around events associated with early information acquisition.  
2.1.4. Market makers. The market maker category includes NYSE specialists (pre-2007), 
designated market makers (post-2007), and other market makers (entire period).10 While all of 
these market makers provide liquidity as their main business, other types of traders may also 
emerge as de-facto liquidity providers at any time.  
                                                            
9 For example, Michael Sobel, head of equity trading at Barclays Global Investors (currently BlackRock), the world’s largest 
manager of ETFs, states that program trading “allows you to do cash and sector balancing… But if you had to boil it down as to 
why we use it, it's because it increases efficiency and reduces costs” (Ortega, 2005). 
10 During our sample period, Supplemental Liquidity Providers (SLPs, introduced in 2008) were categorized the same way as 
other proprietary institutional traders in our dataset. SLP Market Makers (SLMMs) were not introduced on the NYSE until 2012 
and so are not present in our sample.   
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2.2. Theoretical Motivation 
In this section we discuss the theoretical underpinnings of trading in the face of short-lived 
information asymmetries. This discussion helps us link the different types of traders in our 
database to workable empirical predictions. 
Consider a trader who obtains advance information about a pending positive news event 
related to a particular stock. It is clear that the trader will buy the stock prior to the broader release 
of information. A more subtle question is when this trader will sell the stock and realize the rents 
from her superior information. Should it be immediately upon the broad release of information, or 
should she wait a while until “the uninformed crowd” buys into the stock and then take profit? The 
answer to this question depends on several potential frictions. Two notable theories provide 
frameworks for answering these questions, highlighting different frictions and the way they affect 
informed and uninformed trading in the presence of short-lived private information.11  
First is Hirshleifer et al. (1994), in which the main driving friction is risk aversion. They 
offer a two-stage rational expectations model with risk-averse investors of two types: “early-
informed” and “late-informed.” Early-informed investors learn information about a traded asset 
before other investors, and they can trade on their information at date 1. At date 2, the rest of the 
investors learn the information and can trade on it. Noisy liquidity demand in the model ensures 
that prices are not completely revealing, and the market is cleared by risk-neutral market makers. 
As expected, it is optimal for the early-informed investors to trade in the direction of their 
information when this information becomes available to them. When the information becomes 
available to the late-informed investors, risk aversion induces the early-informed to partially 
reverse their position by trading against their early information. Combining the two predictions 
                                                            
11 Holden and Subrahmanyam (1996) show that short-term information becomes dominant in the presence of risk aversion. 
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produces “buy the rumor, sell the news” behavior for positive signals, with a mirror image of this 
strategy when the signal is negative. 
Hirshleifer et al. (1994) also show that the amount of trading by the early-informed 
investors before the information is released more broadly is larger for more favorable 
information.12 As for the late-informed investors, they do not trade early, but instead trade in the 
direction of the signal when it becomes available to them. 
The second model motivating our analysis is Brunnermeier (2005), which highlights the 
importance of the short-term focus of speculators in driving the “sell the news” behavior. A main 
friction in this model is the disparity of trading horizons between traders, as reflected in their focus 
on short- versus long-term signals. Unlike in Hirshleifer et al. (1994), all agents in Brunnermeier’s 
model are risk-neutral. The value of the firm has short-term and long-term components. Some 
investors are informed about the long-term component, while an early-informed speculator gets a 
noisy signal about the short-term component, inducing her to trade in the direction of the signal. 
Importantly, even after the signal is revealed to the public, the early-informed speculator possesses 
an informational advantage compared to the market maker because of her ability to disentangle 
the actual signal from the noise in her own early trading. The market maker mistakenly attributes 
some of the early noise to long-term value, causing the price to overshoot on average in the 
direction of the signal. This makes it optimal for the early-informed speculator to trade against the 
signal when it becomes public by reversing a fraction of her initial position.  
                                                            
12 Another prediction of Hirshleifer et al. (1994) is that there is a negative correlation between the price change on the day of the 
announcement and the trading on that day by the early-informed investors. This prediction, however, is directly attributable to 
the simplifying assumption in their model (made for tractability) that “informed traders are individually infinitesimal and fall on 
a continuum, so that no informed trader can affect the price” (page 1669). We do not pursue this prediction because news-driven 
institutional investors (the early-informed investors in our setting) are not infinitesimal. On the contrary, institutional trading 
would put upward (downward) pressure on prices when institutions buy (sell), which is likely to induce a positive correlation 
between institutional trade imbalance and contemporaneous stock prices. 
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2.2. Empirical Predictions 
The institutional features of different types of traders identified in our data in combination 
with the adding-up constraint and the theoretical models allow us to develop predictions regarding 
trading behavior around analyst recommendation changes.  
2.2.1 Early-informed traders. We identify the early-informed traders in the models as news-
driven institutional investors.13 One way that news-driven institutional investors may be informed 
early is that they receive information about stock recommendations from analysts (or salespeople 
who work at the analyst’s brokerage house) a few days before the analyst recommendation 
becomes public, a practice known as “tipping” (e.g., Irvine et al., 2007).14 Such early information 
leakage is not seen as illegal during our sample period (1999-2010). In an article about analysts 
sharing recommendations early, the Wall Street Journal notes that “securities laws require firms 
like Goldman to engage in ‘fair dealing with clients,’ and prohibit analysts from issuing opinions 
that are at odds with their true beliefs about a stock,” but do not explicitly prohibit sharing 
recommendations early with select clients (Craig, 2009). In contrast, securities laws such as 
Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) do bar selective disclosure by companies to analysts or 
investors, but “no law prevents investors from trading on non-public information they have legally 
purchased from other private entities,” according to securities lawyers (Mullins, Rothfeld, 
McGinty, and Strassburg, 2013).15  
                                                            
13 Clearly even news-driven institutions are a noisy proxy for early-informed investors, as not all news-driven institutions possess 
early information before every analyst recommendation change. The presence of institutions that are not early-informed in the 
news-driven institutional category will add noise to our tests and would bias them against finding any differences between the 
group with early information (news-driven institutions) and the group without it (individuals).    
14 Information about future recommendation changes may also be communicated through responses to analyst surveys conducted 
by institutional investors (e.g., Morgenson, 2014).  
15 Although analysts’ tipping of their clients apparently is not itself illegal, it may not be allowed by brokerage firms and can be 
subject to regulatory action if it involves a breach of trust (insider trading) or lack of internal controls (which are unfortunately 
not well-defined).  The regulators’ approach to tipping may have changed following the end of our sample period. In 2012 the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) fined Goldman Sachs for not having adequate policies and procedures in place to 
address the “risk that the firm’s analysts could share material, nonpublic information about upcoming research changes” in their 
internal meetings, the contents of which are subsequently communicated to select clients (SEC, 2012).  
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Our empirical design also works if news-driven institutional investors are not actually 
informed early about sell-side analysts’ views per se, but rather do their own research and reach 
similar conclusions about stocks in the few days before analysts announce recommendation 
changes, inspiring them to trade as if they had been tipped. Such an alternative would also lead to 
institutional investors being early-informed and would be consistent with other evidence of 
institutions trading as if they are informed before news is released (e.g., Campbell, Ramadorai, 
and Schwartz, 2009; Hendershott, Livdan, and Schürhoff, 2015).  
Within news-driven institutional trades, the two theoretical models are mute about the 
differences between proprietary and agency trading patterns in the face of information asymmetry. 
Such a comparison is valuable given the interest of both policymakers and market participants in 
the trading practices of proprietary traders and the risks they impose on their institutions. Both 
types of news-driven institutions are likely exposed to advantageous information prior to analyst 
recommendation changes, giving rise to the “buy the rumor” strategy. However, the speculative 
nature of proprietary trading and proprietary traders’ focus on short-term profits (as discussed in 
Section 2.1) suggest that they should be more inclined to use quick profit-taking strategies such as 
“selling the news” to partially reverse their initial position. In contrast, agency trades are likely 
reflective of longer-term investment horizons, implying deferred profit-taking. 
In terms of trading magnitudes, both theoretical models predict that the amount of trading 
by early-informed investors prior to the day of the information release is larger for more favorable 
information and thus should be correlated with the price change upon the information release. This 
pattern likely applies to both proprietary and agency trades. The following empirical prediction 
summarizes this discussion. 
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Prediction 1 (trading by news-driven institutional investors):  
 Both proprietary and agency institutional investors will exhibit abnormal trading in the 
direction of an analyst recommendation change in the few days preceding the 
recommendation change (“buy the rumor”). The magnitude of trade will be positively 
correlated with the price change on the day of the recommendation announcement.  
 Proprietary traders are more likely to exhibit short-term profit-taking reflected in 
abnormal trading against the recommendation change when it is publicly announced 
(“sell the news”), partially reversing their initial position. 
2.2.2. Late-informed traders. We identify the models’ late-informed traders as individual 
investors in the data. These investors are not known to acquire information early and thus learn 
about an analyst recommendation change only when the analyst’s report is published. We thus 
have the following prediction.  
Prediction 2 (trading by individuals): Individual investors will not exhibit abnormal 
trading before the recommendation change is announced and will exhibit abnormal trading 
in the direction of the recommendation change when it is announced.16 
2.2.3. Market clearing and liquidity provision. The adding-up constraint raises the question of 
how the market is cleared around analyst recommendation changes. Either a single trader or traders 
in aggregate who provide liquidity around these information events are expected to follow the 
                                                            
16 This prediction comes from Hirshleifer et al. (1994) only; in Brunnermeier (2005) long-term traders (corresponding to 
individuals in our setting) do not trade based on the private signal when it becomes public. The reason is that, unlike in the 
Hirshleifer et al. model, the market maker learns the signal as well. Since the market maker is risk-neutral, she fully absorbs any 
risk and all the information related to the signal is correctly reflected in the price. This risk neutrality, however, is assumed for 
tractability only. If the market maker in Brunnermeier’s model were risk averse, then the picture would change and the long-term 
traders would trade in the direction of the signal when it is publically revealed, in line with the Hirshleifer et al. (1994) prediction. 
We thank Markus Brunnermeier for clarifying this point for us. 
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losing strategy of “selling the rumor and buying the news” around analyst upgrades, allowing the 
early-informed traders to exploit their private information.  
A priori it is not clear whether market makers or non-news-driven institutions (program 
traders) will take opposite positions to the news-driven institutions. On one hand, market makers 
have the formal role of liquidity provision. On the other hand, program traders are not attentive to 
news related to a particular stock, exposing them to a “winner’s curse” problem in the spirit of 
Rock (1986). To see this, note that program traders submit orders for a basket of 15 or more stocks 
for reasons unrelated to the news of any particular stock. The order for each individual stock in the 
basket may be executed in part or in full, or it may not be executed at all; only the executed portion 
appears in our dataset. The execution of the order for a given stock depends on the extent of 
competition program traders face from news-driven institutions. Consider, for example, an 
upcoming upgrade of a particular stock. When news-driven institutions are “buying the rumor” for 
that stock, any sell orders of program traders (submitted for whatever basket rebalancing reasons) 
on that same stock are more likely to be executed simply because news-driven institutions are not 
competing with them on the sell side of the market. Similarly, when news-driven institutions are 
“selling the news,” any buy orders of program traders are more likely to be executed. Thus, the 
orders of program traders that happen to be in the opposite direction of orders submitted by news-
driven institutions are more likely to be adversely selected and therefore to be executed precisely 
when news-driven institutions are on the other side of the trade. Symmetrically, any orders of 
program traders that happen to be in the same direction of orders of news-driven institutions are 
less likely to be executed. Overall, program traders will have an abnormal share of their orders 
executed against the orders of news-driven institutions, making them de-facto liquidity providers 
through adverse selection.  
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Prediction 3 (liquidity provision): Market makers and/or program traders are expected to 
trade in the opposite direction of news-driven institutions. They will exhibit abnormal 
trading against the direction of the analyst recommendation change in the few days 
preceding the recommendation change and will exhibit abnormal trading in the direction 
of the recommendation change when it is publicly announced.  
2.2.4. Other information events. Analyst recommendations are unusual in that different investors 
may be informed about an analyst’s views at different points in time. This practice does not appear 
to be illegal, as discussed above. In contrast, for many other firm-related news releases (such as 
earning announcements) differential information release is illegal, especially since the enactment 
of Reg FD in August 2000. Our next prediction concerns such placebo information events, which 
are plausibly not associated with early release of information.  
Prediction 4 (placebo information events): For informational events that are not associated 
with short-term informational advantages, news-driven institutions (both proprietary and 
agency) will not exhibit either “buy the rumor” or “sell the news” trading activity. 
3. Data, Methodology, and Descriptive Statistics 
Our analysis uses analyst stock recommendation data from the Thomson Financial 
Institutional Brokers Estimate (I/B/E/S) U.S. Detail File,17 data on daily buy and sell transaction 
volume by trader type from the NYSE Consolidated Equity Audit Trail Data (CAUD) database, 
stock data from the Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) database, and institutional 
holdings data from the Thomson Financial 13F quarterly holdings database. We also use 
information from the annual Institutional Investor All-Star Analyst rankings. Our sample period is 
                                                            
17 The data we use were pulled in early 2012 and so reflect the corrections Thomson made in 2007 in response to the findings of 
Ljungqvist, Malloy, and Marston (2009) that previous versions of the I/B/E/S database had been altered.  
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1999 to mid-2010, and our sample includes all NYSE-listed domestic common stocks for which 
there are valid analyst recommendation changes in I/B/E/S, as defined in the next subsection.  
3.1. Analyst recommendation changes 
We define analyst recommendation changes based on the three-tier scale of buy, hold, and 
sell. We convert recommendations from the less common five-tier scale (e.g., strong buy, buy, 
hold, sell, strong sell) to the three-tier scale before identifying recommendation changes, so that 
our assessment of recommendation changes is not contaminated by the widespread change from 
five-tier to three-tier rating scales in 2002 prompted by the Global Analyst Research Settlement 
(Kadan, Madureira, Wang, and Zach, 2009). We define recommendation changes as upgrades or 
downgrades within the three-tier scale for which the previous recommendation was issued by the 
same brokerage firm within the past year, to minimize the possibility of stale forecasts. We use the 
date and time stamps in I/B/E/S to identify the exact day of the recommendation change (the event 
day). To ensure that the recommendation date we consider is the relevant one in terms of the 
trading activity surrounding it, if a recommendation is released after 4:00 p.m. we designate the 
next trading day as the recommendation change day.  
To separate the effect of analyst recommendation changes from firm-specific news 
(Altinkilic and Hansen, 2009; Kim and Song, 2015), we apply two screens similar to Loh and Stulz 
(2011). First, we remove recommendation changes that occur on the same day as or the day 
following earnings announcements. Second, we remove recommendation changes on days when 
multiple analysts issue recommendations for the same firm, as clustering in recommendations may 
reflect the release of firm-specific news (Bradley, Jordan, and Ritter, 2008).18 These filters remove 
                                                            
18 This filter does not work for stocks covered by only one analyst, since clustering requires more than one analyst.  In our sample, 
only about 0.6% of the recommendation changes occur in stocks covered by only one analyst, and excluding those 
recommendation changes does not affect our results.  
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about 28% of the recommendation changes in our sample period. As robustness checks, we also 
exclude recommendation changes when a stock has other recommendation changes in the prior 
four days, when recommendations are clustered in three-day periods, and on dividend 
announcement days.  
3.2. The NYSE data and main variables of interest 
We use proprietary data from the NYSE that allow us to precisely identify the trading 
activity of news-driven institutional investors (and proprietary versus agency separately), program 
institutions (and index-arbitrage versus non-index-arbitrage separately), individuals, and market 
makers, as discussed in Section 2.1. The dataset is constructed from the NYSE’s CAUD files, 
which are the result of matching trade reports to the underlying order data. CAUD contains 
information on all orders that execute on the NYSE, including both trades that are executed 
electronically and those that are executed manually (by floor brokers). For each trade, CAUD 
shows the executed portion of the underlying buy and sell orders along with an account-type 
variable. Because CAUD reports the buyer and seller for each trade based on actual order data, the 
classification of buy and sell volume in our data set is exact, and thus we do not have to rely on 
trade classification algorithms. Providing the account-type classification is mandatory for brokers, 
although it is not audited by the NYSE on an order-by-order basis.19 The CAUD database contains 
information at the stock/trade level; our dataset is derived from CAUD and contains total share 
volume and dollar volume bought and sold by each trader type for each stock/day.  
Our CAUD-based dataset has two main advantages. First is its coverage. CAUD covers a 
large portion of trading in NYSE stocks and is therefore likely to provide a representative picture 
                                                            
19 Kaniel et al. (2008) point out that any abnormal use of the individual investor designation by brokers in hopes of gaining 
advantages is likely to draw attention, preventing abuse of the system.  
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of trading.20 Second is the separate identification of different trader types. CAUD is one of the few 
databases that identify individual, institutional, and market maker trading, as well as key subsets 
within institutional trades.  
We construct daily measures of trading volume and trade imbalance for each trader type in 
each stock, and we standardize the measures by the rolling average daily volume over the prior 
year.21 Specifically, we define Raw Trading Volume for stock i, investor type x, on day t as:22 
ܴܽݓ	ܶݎܽ݀݅݊݃	ܸ݋݈ݑ݉݁௜,௫,௧
ൌ ൫ܦ݋݈݈ܽݎܸ݋݈ݑ݉݁ܤ݋ݑ݄݃ݐ௜,௫,௧ ൅ ܦ݋݈݈ܽݎܸ݋݈ݑ݉݁ܵ݋݈݀௜,௫,௧൯/2ܥܴܵܲܣݒ݃ܦ݈ܽ݅ݕܸ݋݈ݑ݉݁௜,௬ିଵ 																						ሺ1ሻ 
where DollarVolumeBoughti,x,t and DollarVolumeSoldi,x,t are the dollar volume of shares of stock 
i bought and sold, respectively, by investor type x on day t, and CRSPAvgDailyVolumei,y-1 is the 
CRSP average daily dollar volume of stock i in the year ending one week before the 
recommendation change, y-1. Similarly, we define Raw Trade Imbalance for stock i, investor type 
x, on day t as: 23 
ܴܽݓ	ܶݎܽ݀݁	ܫܾ݈݉ܽܽ݊ܿ݁௜,௫,௧
ൌ ܦ݋݈݈ܽݎܸ݋݈ݑ݉݁ܤ݋ݑ݄݃ݐ௜,௫,௧ െ ܦ݋݈݈ܽݎܸ݋݈ݑ݉݁ܵ݋݈݀௜,௫,௧ܥܴܵܲܣݒ݃ܦ݈ܽ݅ݕܸ݋݈ݑ݉݁௜,௬ିଵ 																													ሺ2ሻ 
To isolate the abnormal trading volume and abnormal trade imbalance surrounding analyst 
recommendation changes, we identify a benchmark period for each recommendation change. Our 
                                                            
20 In the first half of our sample period, over 80% of trading in NYSE-listed stocks occurs on the NYSE and is therefore captured 
by CAUD. After the 2007 merger of NYSE with ARCA, our dataset includes trades on ARCA as well as on NYSE. We perform 
robustness checks for the early versus latter part of the sample period, when more trading occurs off the NYSE. Our results hold 
for both sub-periods.  
21 Standardizing by lagged average daily volume helps to make changes comparable across stocks, as in Kaniel et al. (2008). We 
replicate our tests with alternate variable scaling in our robustness checks. 
22 The numerator in equation (1) is divided by two because CAUD reports buys and sells separately; the sum of all buys plus all 
sells is equal to twice total volume. The actual trading volume for each trader type depends on the extent to which traders trade 
with their own type versus other types of traders, since each trade consists of a buy and a sell. If traders trade only with their own 
type, trader-type volume equals (trader-type buys + trader-type sells)/2, as we have defined it here; at the other extreme, if all 
traders trade only with other trader types, trader-type volume equals (trader-type buys + trader-type sells). Statistical inference is 
the same whichever volume approximation is used; we divide by two in keeping with the single-counting in the denominator.  
23 Trade imbalance is sometimes referred to in the literature as “order imbalance.” We use the term trade imbalance because we 
observe only executed trades, not all orders submitted, in our dataset.  
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benchmark period is 45 to 11 days before and 11 to 45 days after the day of the analyst 
recommendation change. We calculate the Benchmark Trading Volume for stock i, investor type 
x, with analyst recommendation change on day t as the average Raw Trading Volume over days t-
45 to t-11 and t+11 to t+45. Similarly, we calculate the Benchmark Trade Imbalance for stock i, 
investor type x, with analyst recommendation change on day t as the average Raw Trade Imbalance 
over days t-45 to t-11 and t+11 to t+45. 
Our main variables of interest are the abnormal trading volume and abnormal trade 
imbalance for each investor type and recommendation change, defined as: 
ܣܾ݊݋ݎ݈݉ܽ	ܶݎܽ݀݅݊݃	ܸ݋݈ݑ݉݁௜,௫,௧
ൌ ܴܽݓ	ܶݎܽ݀݅݊݃	ܸ݋݈ݑ݉݁௜,௫,௧ െ ܤ݄݁݊ܿ݉ܽݎ݇	ܶݎܽ݀݅݊݃	ܸ݋݈ݑ݉݁௜,௫,௧										ሺ3ሻ 
and  
ܣܾ݊݋ݎ݈݉ܽ	ܶݎܽ݀݁	ܫܾ݈݉ܽܽ݊ܿ݁௜,௫,௧
ൌ ܴܽݓ	ܶݎܽ݀݁	ܫܾ݈݉ܽܽ݊ܿ݁௜,௫,௧ െ ܤ݄݁݊ܿ݉ܽݎ݇	ܶݎܽ݀݁	ܫܾ݈݉ܽܽ݊ܿ݁௜,௫,௧					ሺ4ሻ 
To calculate the benchmark period volume and imbalance, and thus the abnormal volume 
and imbalance for each recommendation change, we require at least 45 days of data before and 
after the recommendation change, reducing our sample from the eleven and a half years (January 
1, 1999 to July 1, 2010) for which we have NYSE data to recommendation changes occurring 
between March 10, 1999 and April 22, 2010.  
3.3. Descriptive statistics 
Panel A of Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the 2,122 stocks in our sample. 
Because our sample is restricted to firms with at least one analyst recommendation change, the 
stocks in our sample are generally large, with an average market capitalization $6.490 billion. The 
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average number of analysts covering a firm in our sample is seven (with a median of six), and the 
average institutional holdings is 66.6%.  
Panel B shows how much trading is done by each trader type in our sample stocks. The 
total trading volume over the 1999 to mid-2010 period is over $97 trillion. News-driven 
institutional trades account for 67.7% of the total trading volume, and program institutional trades 
come in second at 22.2%. Market makers account for 8.4% of trading volume, while individuals 
represent 1.6%, which may appear small but nonetheless represents over $1.5 trillion of trading. 
The majority of news-driven institutional trades are agency trades: 58.7% of the total shares traded 
versus 9.1% that are proprietary trades. Within program institutional trades, non-index-arbitrage 
trades outweigh index-arbitrage trades by more than nine-to-one: 20.0% of total versus 2.2%.  
Panel C summarizes the distribution of analyst recommendation changes by year. Overall, 
there are about five percent more downgrades than upgrades in our sample: 15,907 downgrades 
versus 15,101 upgrades. This ratio is consistent with prior literature (e.g., Kecskes et al., 2017). 
Both analyst upgrades and analyst downgrades are accompanied by large average abnormal returns 
on the day they are announced: Average one-day returns are 1.96% for upgrades and -1.83% for 
downgrades. The returns reported here and throughout this study are taken from CRSP and so do 
not take commissions into account. Using Ancerno data on institutional trades and commissions 
for a period that overlaps our study, Goldstein, Irvine, Kandel, and Weiner (2009) find that 
institutional commissions are generally between one and five cents per share, or five to 15 basis 
points as a percentage of share price, suggesting that the potential profit on analyst 
recommendation changes exceeds commission costs.   
[Table 1 here] 
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4. Empirical evidence  
We begin by providing preliminary evidence documenting the trading volume of each 
trader type around analyst recommendation changes in Section 4.1. In Section 4.2 we study the 
trade imbalances of each group, allowing us to test Predictions 1, 2, and 3. In Section 4.3 we 
estimate news-driven traders’ profits around recommendation changes and examine how the 
magnitude of their imbalances is related to recommendation-day price changes. In Section 4.4 we 
investigate how institutional trading patterns differ across firm and analyst characteristics.  
4.1. Preliminary results: Trading volume around recommendation changes 
Figures 1 and 2 provide a first look at trading volume surrounding analyst recommendation 
changes. Figure 1-A (2-A) shows the average Raw Trading Volume for each of the main categories 
of traders over the period from 45 days before to 45 days after an upgrade (downgrade). Figure 1-
B (2-B) shows the average Abnormal Trading Volume in the days immediately surrounding an 
analyst upgrade (downgrade).  
[Figures 1 & 2 here] 
All of the trader-type volumes appear to increase around analyst recommendation changes, 
with the largest spike occurring in the news-driven institutional category. Critically, in selecting 
these recommendation changes we have removed all earnings announcement dates and dates of 
clustered stock recommendations from multiple analysts. Thus the spike in volume around 
recommendation changes is likely associated with the recommendation change itself, not other 
news such as earnings announcements. 
In Table 2 we test the statistical significance of the volume patterns displayed in Figures 1 
and 2. We examine the cumulative abnormal volume for each trader type in the four days prior to 
the recommendation change (Day -4 to -1), on the recommendation-change day (Day 0), and in 
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the four days following the recommendation change (Day +1 to +4). We choose a four-day pre-
recommendation-change period based on the typical time between when analyst reports enter the 
internal review process and when the report is publicly released. Irvine et al. (2007) report that a 
four- to five-day lag is typical, and our discussions with equity analysts suggest that three to five 
days is typical during our sample period. To adjust for potential cross-sectional correlation and 
idiosyncratic time-series persistence, we report t-statistics that are based on standard errors double-
clustered on stock and date in this and all subsequent analyses (Thompson, 2011). 
[Table 2 here] 
Table 2 presents the results separately for upgrades (Panel A) and downgrades (Panel B). 
The results show clearly that volume is significantly higher on the recommendation change day 
(day 0) for all trader types and for upgrades and downgrades. Note that the day-0 abnormal 
volumes for the news-driven institutional and individual categories differ by an order of 
magnitude. For example, for upgrades the day-0 news-driven institutional abnormal volume is 
36.73%, nearly 30 times individual abnormal volume of 1.26%.  
4.2. Direction and timing of trade around recommendation changes 
Figures 3 and 4 present the average abnormal buy-sell trade imbalances surrounding 
analyst recommendation changes. These figures provide a graphical image of the adding-up 
constraint, and they offer a preliminary look at how Predictions 1 through 3 fare with the data. 
Panels A and B of Figure 3 show that all trader-type trade imbalances are quite flat until a few 
days before the upgrades. Just prior to the information release (days -4 to -1), we see a notable 
increase in positive imbalance by news-driven institutional traders, which reverses to a negative 
imbalance on the day the upgrade is announced; the build-up of imbalances and partial reversal 
are illustrated in Panel C. This pattern is consistent with “buy the rumor, sell the news” behavior. 
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The trade imbalances of individuals tell a very different story. The abnormal imbalances of 
individual investors appear roughly flat before upgrades and then slightly positive on the day the 
upgrade is announced. Figure 3 also reveals that market-maker imbalances are far less than 
required to offset the institutional imbalances. Instead, it is program institutional traders who 
emerge as the counterparties of the early-informed news-driven institutions, adversely selected to 
serve the role of de-facto liquidity providers around these events. The abnormal imbalance of 
program institutions forms nearly a mirror image to that of news-driven institutional investors 
before and on the day of upgrades.  
Figure 4 suggests similar but less pronounced behavior for news-driven institutions around 
downgrades. Individual imbalances are more muted around downgrades than upgrades, and 
program institutions once again appear to absorb the trade imbalances of news-driven institutions. 
 [Figures 3 & 4 here] 
In Table 3 we formally test Predictions 1 through 3 by considering the different sub-
categories of trader types and testing the statistical significance of the imbalance patterns displayed 
in Figures 3 and 4. We examine the cumulative abnormal imbalance for each trader type in the 
four days prior to the recommendation change (Day -4 to -1), on the recommendation-change day 
(Day 0), and in the four days following the recommendation change (Day +1 to +4). A positive 
(negative) value corresponds to excess buying (selling) activity relative to the benchmark period.  
[Table 3 here] 
Table 3 presents the results separately for upgrades (Panel A) and downgrades (Panel B). 
Note that the sum of abnormal trade imbalances across all trader types for any given time period 
is always zero, reflecting the adding-up constraint. The table breaks down the trading by trader-
type categories and sub-categories. 
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We consider the buying and selling pattern of the early-informed traders first. The results 
for news-driven institutional trades (the early-informed) show significant abnormal buying activity 
equal to 4.26% of average daily volume during the four days prior to an upgrade (Panel A of Table 
3). On the day of the upgrade we observe abnormal selling activity by news-driven institutions 
equal to 1.43% of average daily volume. Thus, news-driven institutions appear to unload about a 
third of the amount they bought, taking profits immediately upon the information release. The 
analysis of the proprietary versus agency sub-categories shows that the “buying the rumor” activity 
applies to both types of traders, consistent with the idea that both proprietary and agency traders 
obtain information in advance of recommendation changes. In contrast, the two types of news-
driven institutions exhibit different patterns of profit-taking. While proprietary traders exhibit 
significant abnormal selling on the day of the recommendation change, the trading of agency 
traders on that day is not statistically significant. Focusing on proprietary traders, we see that they 
buy 1.29% of average trading volume on the four days prior to the upgrade and then sell 0.70% of 
daily volume on the news-release date. Thus, proprietary traders take immediate profit for more 
than 50% of their initial buying activity, indicating that their trading horizon is quite short. The 
fact that agency trades do not exhibit a significant “sell the news” activity supports the view that 
their trading horizon is longer.24  
The results in Panel B of Table 3 reveal that news-driven institutions also significantly sell 
before downgrades and buy on downgrade announcements, consistent with a “sell the rumor, buy 
the news” strategy. Echoing the results for upgrades, both proprietary and agency institutional 
traders appear to significantly sell before the downgrades, but only the proprietary traders 
                                                            
24 Agency traders buy 2.97% of average trading volume prior to the recommendation change and sell a statistically insignificant 
amount of 0.73% of average trading volume on the day of the recommendation change. Ignoring the statistical insignificance of 
this estimate, we can infer that agency traders take profits on less than 25% of their trades immediately, which is less than a half 
of the percentage immediately unloaded by proprietary traders. This is another indication of the longer-term focus of agency 
traders compared to proprietary traders.  
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significantly buy on the announcement day (continuing into the following four days), consistent 
with reversing their positions to take short-term profits. Economically, the proprietary trader 
results for downgrades are even larger than for upgrades. Proprietary traders sell 1.7% of average 
trading volume prior to the downgrade and then buy 1.43% when the downgrade is announced. 
Thus, they immediately reverse 84% of their original trades, once again evidencing their short-
term focus. 
Overall, the results for news-driven institutional trades around both upgrades and 
downgrades are consistent with Prediction 1. We see that both types of news-driven institutions 
“buy the rumor” but only proprietary traders “sell the news,” reversing 50%-84% of their initial 
position upon the information release.  
Turning to individuals, the late-informed traders, Panels A and B of Table 3 mostly provide 
support for Prediction 2. First, individuals do not trade in the direction of information prior to 
recommendation changes (upgrades or downgrades). Second, the prediction that individuals 
should exhibit net buying on the day of upgrades is supported in Panel A (t-statistic of 1.9 
corresponding to a p-value of 0.06). On the other hand, selling on the day of downgrades is 
insignificant in Panel B, likely because individuals do not tend to engage in short selling.25  
Individual investors can relatively easily respond to upgrades by buying the recommended stocks, 
but can trade on downgrades only if they already hold a particular stock or through a short sale.  
To complete the picture we now consider how the market is cleared. Recall that either 
market makers or program traders may serve as liquidity providers (see Prediction 3). The results 
in both Panels A and B show that program traders take the lion’s share of the opposite position to 
news-driven institutions both before and on the days of analyst recommendation changes. The 
                                                            
25 In the U.S., short selling requires opening a margin account with a broker, making it less common among individuals. 
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abnormal trade imbalances of program traders for both upgrades and downgrades have the opposite 
sign to the imbalances of news-driven institutions, with a similar order of magnitude. In the sub-
categories we see that non-index-arbitrage program traders play the dominant role in this trading 
activity. As discussed in Section 2, much of this trading activity reflects basket trading such as that 
of ETFs, which are not attentive to firm-specific news. As a result, program traders “win” more 
than their fair share of trades against the early-informed trades of news-driven institutions, 
rendering them de-facto liquidity providers. Meanwhile market-maker imbalances are not 
significant. One potential explanation is that market makers do supply liquidity at the time of the 
recommendation change but then unwind their positions over the rest of the day in order minimize 
their overnight inventory risk. This explanation is consistent with our observation in Table 2 that 
market maker volume is higher on recommendation change days, although their imbalances are 
not. A second potential explanation is that market makers have little need to step in when program 
traders are providing liquidity. In a robustness check, we examine the behavior of market makers 
before and after the NYSE’s Hybrid market introduction, when specialists were replaced by 
designated market makers (Hendershott and Moulton, 2011). Market makers emerge as significant 
liquidity providers only in the four days before downgrades that occur post-Hybrid. Even at that 
time, program institutional traders still supply the bulk of liquidity to news-driven institutions.  
4.3. Economic magnitude of early-informed trading and profits 
To assess the economic significance of the effect of information differences we now 
consider the magnitude of the profits associated with obtaining advance information. News-driven 
institutions’ buying before analyst upgrades combined with the typical pattern of stock prices 
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increasing on analyst upgrades gives rise to considerable short-term estimated profits.26 During 
our 1999-2010 sample period, the average return from buying the rumor four days before an 
analyst upgrade and selling the news on the upgrade day, and executing the mirror-image strategy 
around analyst downgrades, is 1.71%. For proprietary traders who use leverage, the effective 
percentage returns would be even larger. We estimate aggregate news-driven institutional dollar 
profits based on the cumulative share imbalances acquired by news-driven institutions around 
analyst upgrades and the associated stock price changes by marking the aggregate cumulative 
position to market each day at the closing price. News-driven institutional profits from four days 
before to four days after an analyst recommendation change are approximately $61,000 per 
recommendation change, for a total of about $1.9 billion for the 31,008 recommendation changes 
in our sample. Given the aggregation in our dataset, these profit estimates are undoubtedly a lower 
bound, with the actual profits of the truly early-informed traders partially offset by uninformed 
trading within the news-driven institutional category.   
An important determinant of the profits associated with information asymmetries is the 
quality of the signal. Recall that Prediction 1 states that the “buying the rumor” activity should be 
intensified for stronger signals, resulting in a positive correlation between trade imbalances before 
the recommendation changes and the price change on the day of the recommendation 
announcement. To evaluate this prediction we consider the following regression specification: 
ܫܾ݈݉ܽܽ݊ܿ݁௜,௧ିସ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௧ ൅ ߝ௜,௧ିସ	,						ሺ5ሻ 
where Imbalancei,t-4 cumulates news-driven institutional imbalances over the four days prior to the 
analyst recommendation change and Returni,t is the abnormal return for stock i on the day of the 
                                                            
26 Because our dataset contains trading information aggregated by trader type, rather than trade by trade, we cannot assess the 
profitability of individual traders within each type. We also cannot observe trades in other markets that may be part of a larger 
strategy, such as hedged positions or multiple-security strategies.  
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analyst recommendation change, measured as the stock return minus the CRSP equal-weighted 
market return. Table 4 presents the results. 
[Table 4 here] 
Panel A of Table 4 presents the analysis for upgrades, for the entire news-driven 
institutional category in the first column and for the two sub-categories, proprietary and agency 
trades, in the remaining columns. For the entire news-driven institutional category (first column), 
the intercept is positive (3.25%) and significant (t-statistic of 4.1), indicating that news-driven 
institutions net buy stocks in the four days before they are upgraded even with no abnormal day-0 
return. In addition, the coefficient on Return is significantly positive and economically meaningful, 
as an upgrade with the average 1.96% abnormal return would imply about a 1% higher imbalance 
(0.0196 x .51256) in the four days prior to the upgrade. Thus, news-driven institutions appear to 
buy more of the about-to-be-upgraded stocks whose prices rise more on the day of the upgrade. 
This is consistent with Prediction 1 that both the news-driven institutional buying and the 
subsequent change in price are driven by the same signal.27 A similar picture emerges for 
downgrades, with the positive coefficient on Return indicating that news-driven institutions net 
sell more of the about-to-be-downgraded stocks that have the largest negative returns on the day 
the downgrades are announced. The coefficient estimates for returns lose significance in most of 
the proprietary and agency sub-category regressions (second and third columns of Panels A and 
B), though their intercepts remain significant, consistent with Table 3.  
Prior literature has found that prices continue to drift in the same direction for up to several 
months following analyst recommendation changes (e.g., Womack 1996, Kecskes et al., 2017). 
                                                            
27 We also separately examine the subset of analyst recommendation changes for which the abnormal return is in the opposite 
direction: negative returns on upgrade announcements and positive returns on downgrades. These opposite-reaction cases 
comprise 18.9% of the upgrades and 21.1% of the downgrades. We find that there is no significant imbalance for news-driven 
institutions prior to upgrades (downgrades) that have negative (positive) abnormal returns on the day they are announced.  
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Although it is not possible from our data to determine how long positions are held, it is nonetheless 
interesting to see whether news-driven institutions successfully identify analyst recommendation 
changes that will have not only the largest immediate price reactions (as shown in Table 4), but 
also the largest longer-term price movements. In Table 5 we present the average size-adjusted 
returns on the recommendation change day, the subsequent month, and the subsequent six months 
calculated on an unweighted basis and then calculated weighting each return by the abnormal trade 
imbalance of news-driven institutions in the four days prior to the recommendation change. Size-
adjusted returns are calculated relative to CRSP market capitalization size decile returns, as in 
Womack (1996).  
[Table 5 here] 
Table 5 shows that the post-recommendation-change drift is greater for upgrades than 
downgrades in our sample. Interestingly, the longer holding period returns are higher overall when 
weighted by the institutional trade imbalances, with the one- and six-month post-upgrade returns 
showing the biggest gains from imbalance weighting. For example, while the six-month 
unweighted abnormal return is 6.55% for upgrades, when weighted by the institutional trade 
imbalances it is 9.39%. While we do not have information concerning the holding period of news-
driven institutions, the superior weighted returns suggest that their buying decisions are effective 
for longer-term as well as short-term horizons.   
4.4. Multivariate analysis of news-driven institutional trades 
In line with the discussion in the previous section, we expect that across different 
recommendation changes, early-informed investors would trade more strongly on analyst 
recommendation changes that have higher information content. One such case is when the analyst 
issuing the recommendation is an “all-star” analyst. Additionally, it is likely that the signal is more 
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informative for small stocks, which are covered by fewer analysts and are subject to greater 
information asymmetries. Furthermore, we would expect that news-driven institutions would be 
more inclined to trade on analyst recommendations for stocks they already own, namely when 
institutional ownership is high. In particular, we expect that institutions would be more inclined to 
trade prior to downgrades when they already own the stock and thus no short selling is required or 
when other institutions hold it and it is easier to borrow for a short sale. Pontiff (2006) predicts 
that traders engaged in risky arbitrage will take smaller speculative positions when idiosyncratic 
risk is large. His intuition is that such traders are not fully hedged and so large idiosyncratic 
movements in price deter them from taking large positions. Applying this intuition to our situation, 
institutions may be less likely to “buy the rumor and sell the news” in stocks with higher 
idiosyncratic risk, proxied by volatility.  To investigate these cross-sectional implications, we run 
regressions of the following form: 
ܫܾ݈݉ܽܽ݊ܿ݁௜,௧ା௞
ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚଵܣ݈݈ܵݐܽݎ௜,௧ ൅ ߚଶ݈݈ܵ݉ܽܨ݅ݎ݉௜,௧ ൅ ߚଷܮܽݎ݃݁ܨ݅ݎ݉௜,௧ ൅ ߚସܪ݄݅݃ܫ݊ݏݐ௜,௧
൅ ߚହܮ݋ݓܫ݊ݏݐ௜,௧ ൅ ߚ଺ܪ݄ܸ݅݃݋݈ܽݐ௜,௧ ൅ ߚ଻ܮ݋ݓܸ݋݈ܽݐ௜,௧
൅ ߝ௜,௧ା௞	,																																																																																																																				ሺ6ሻ 
where Imbalancei,t+k is the news-driven institutional abnormal trade imbalance in stock i with a 
recommendation change on day t. The variable k takes values in {-4, 0, 4}. When k = 0 we are 
focusing on the abnormal volume on the day of the recommendation change (day t); when k = -4 
we are cumulating the abnormal imbalance over the four days prior to the recommendation change 
(days t-4 to t-1); and when k = 4 we are cumulating the abnormal imbalance over the four days 
following the recommendation change (days t+1 to t+4). AllStari,t is an indicator variable that is 
equal to one if the analyst making the recommendation change is ranked as an all-star analyst by 
Institutional Investor in the prior year, else zero; SmallFirmi,t (LargeFirmi,t) is an indicator variable 
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that is equal to one if the firm is in the smallest (largest) firm-size quartile based on the firms in 
the recommendation-change sample, else zero; HighInsti,t (LowInsti,t) is an indicator variable that 
is equal to one if the firm is in the highest (lowest) institutional ownership percentage quartile as 
of the previous quarter-end, else zero; and HighVolati,t (LowVolati,t) is an indicator variable that is 
equal to one if the firm is in the highest (lowest) return volatility quartile as of the previous quarter-
end, else zero.28 
[Table 6 here] 
The regression results in Panel A of Table 6 show that, all else equal, the “buy the rumor, 
sell the news” trading of news-driven institutions around analyst upgrades is stronger for small 
firms. This is consistent with news-driven institutions being more likely to possess advantageous 
information about smaller firms. A similar result holds for stocks with high institutional ownership, 
reflecting that these are the stocks in which news-driven institutions are more likely to be active 
(for a given level of firm size). The “buy the rumor, sell the news” trading activity is weaker for 
stocks with high volatility. Traders buy significantly less on the rumor and sell more on the news 
(negative coefficient on days -4 to -1 and positive coefficient on day 0 for high volatility stocks), 
supporting the Pontiff (2006) conjecture that speculators are less likely to engage in risky arbitrage 
in more volatile stocks. The results also suggest that news-driven institutions are more likely to 
“buy the rumor” when the analyst issuing the recommendation is an all-star analyst, but the 
statistical significance is weaker (t-statistic of 1.9).  
Panel B shows that the corresponding “sell the rumor, buy the news” pattern of trading 
around analyst downgrades is larger for smaller stocks and those with the highest institutional 
ownership. The latter result is consistent with news-driven institutions finding it easier to trade on 
                                                            
28 The results of similar regressions including additional cross-sectional explanatory variables are discussed in Section 6.  
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downgrades when they already hold the stock or when it is widely held by institutions, making it 
easier to borrow for a short sale. The Pontiff (2006) prediction is also supported in the case of 
downgrades, with high-volatility stocks showing a significant positive coefficient before and 
negative coefficient the day of downgrades, suggesting that the sell the rumor, buy the news trading 
pattern is indeed weaker for more volatile stocks.  
5. Placebo tests: Information events without early information leakage 
To strengthen the foundation of our tests, we also examine the counterfactual: What are the 
trading patterns around events that are not accompanied by early information acquisition by some 
investors? Our Prediction 4 states that those instances should not induce either the “buy the rumor” 
or the “sell the news” trading patterns. If such events do induce the buy/sell trading pattern, it 
would suggest that our main results may not be driven by trading on early information acquisition. 
For example, perhaps news-driven institutional investors always buy before and sell on days with 
large positive returns, and analyst upgrades are simply one cause of large positive returns. A related 
concern is that there may be omitted variables related to the behavior of different trader types, 
driving the differences in their trading behavior irrespective of whether they are early-informed or 
late-informed. To address these concerns, we conduct three placebo (falsification) tests to examine 
the trading behavior of different trader types around times when we do not expect some investors 
to be informed early: analyst reiterations of previously published recommendations (or 
“confirming” recommendations), earnings announcements, and days with large abnormal returns 
without recommendation or earnings announcements. In all three cases we do not expect that some 
traders are early informed, so we should not find “buy the rumor” and/or “sell the news” trading 
patterns.   
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Our first placebo test examines analyst reiterations of previously published 
recommendations: for example, when an analyst who has already rated a stock as a “buy” 
announces that she is maintaining her “buy” recommendation. There are 17,286 such analyst 
reiterations for NYSE stocks in our sample period, and they have an average abnormal one-day 
return of 0.0349% (p-value <0.001). Table 7 presents the mean abnormal trade imbalances for 
each trader type surrounding these reiterations.  
[Table 7 here] 
Consistent with Prediction 4, Panel A shows no evidence of news-driven institutional 
investors net buying or selling in the days before the reiteration is announced, nor do any of the 
trader types or sub-categories demonstrate significant imbalances on the day of the reiteration 
announcement. In the next two panels we focus on the subsamples of reiterations that are 
accompanied by the largest price moves (top-quartile abnormal returns, which average 3.752%, in 
Panel B and bottom-quartile abnormal returns, which average -3.202%, in Panel C). If the largest 
returns are a reaction to the reiterations (for example, when the market expects an analyst to 
downgrade a stock but the analyst maintains her recommendation), we could see imbalance 
patterns similar to those for analyst recommendation changes if news-driven institutional investors 
are informed early about the surprising reiteration. The results in Panels B and C do not show any 
“buy the rumor, sell the news” behavior. It is likely that gaining information that a reiteration will 
have a significant impact is harder than gaining information that a recommendation change will 
move a stock’s price. The early-informed trader needs to correctly anticipate that the analyst will 
not change the recommendation and know that the market expects the analyst to change the 
recommendation.  
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Our second placebo test uses earnings announcements as placebo events. Earnings 
announcements generally lead to large returns, but early information leakage is unlikely. Insider 
trading laws and regulations (e.g., Reg FD) prevent companies from revealing material non-public 
information to analysts and investors prior to earnings announcements. We construct the earnings 
announcement sample as follows. For each analyst recommendation change in our sample, we 
identify a placebo event defined as the earnings announcement date for the same stock that has the 
closest abnormal return to that of the analyst recommendation change (day 0).29,30 We exclude 
from consideration the nine-day periods (days t-4 to t+4) surrounding all actual analyst 
recommendation change dates for that stock, to avoid overlap with analyst recommendation 
changes. Placebo events are chosen without replacement, so there are no duplicates in the placebo 
event set. Because of the limited number of earnings announcements for each stock, our placebo 
sample is somewhat smaller than the recommendation change sample (25,931 placebo events 
versus 31,008 recommendation changes). Table 8 presents the mean abnormal trade imbalances 
for each trader type surrounding earnings announcements with positive abnormal returns (Panel 
A) and negative abnormal returns (Panel B).  
 [Table 8 here] 
The results in Table 8 support Prediction 4. Most importantly, for earnings announcement 
days with large abnormal returns, news-driven institutions do not exhibit the “buy the rumor, sell 
the news” behavior associated with early information acquisition. In contrast to the results in our 
analysis of analyst recommendation changes, news-driven institutions do not demonstrate 
                                                            
29 We define “closest abnormal return” as the return that has the same sign as and minimum absolute distance from the day-0 
abnormal return of the actual analyst recommendation change. The average abnormal return is 3.350% on the positive placebo 
dates and -3.271% on the negative placebo dates.  
30 In the presence of Reg FD, it is unlikely that there exist any informational differences among investors regarding the announced 
earnings. Large price changes and high volume following earnings announcements can be explained by differences in 
interpretation as in Harris and Raviv (1993).  
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significant buying prior to earnings announcements with positive abnormal returns (Panel A), nor 
do they exhibit significant net selling prior to earnings announcements with negative abnormal 
returns (Panel B). Furthermore, news-driven institutional investors are net buyers rather than 
sellers on the day of earnings announcements with positive abnormal returns, and they are net 
sellers rather than buyers on the day of earnings announcements with negative abnormal returns. 
Interestingly, individuals exhibit net abnormal selling on positive-return earnings announcements 
and in the following days, consistent with individuals providing liquidity to institutions.31  
Market makers also emerge as significant liquidity providers on positive earnings 
announcement days, in contrast to their generally neutral net trading pattern on analyst 
recommendation change days. Why market makers are willing to provide liquidity (i.e., carry 
overnight inventory following earnings announcements) around scheduled earnings 
announcements but not around the unscheduled analyst recommendation changes is not obvious. 
One reason may be that trading volume is significantly higher around earnings announcements, 
making it easier for market makers to trade out of their positions if they want to reduce their risk. 
On average trading volume is 18% higher on earnings announcement days compared to 
recommendation change days. A countervailing effect comes from stock return volatility, which 
is 20% higher around earnings announcements than around recommendation changes, suggesting 
greater inventory risk. However, bid-ask spreads are also wider (by 11%), suggesting that market 
makers are compensated for taking additional risk around earnings announcements, which may 
explain their higher liquidity provision.     
Our third placebo test examines days on which stocks exhibit large abnormal returns but 
have neither analyst recommendation nor earnings announcements, capturing various other 
                                                            
31 This result is consistent with Kaniel et al. (2008), who find patterns of individual trading consistent with risk-averse individuals 
providing liquidity to institutions.  
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substantial information events. We construct the placebo sample as follows. For each analyst 
recommendation change in our sample, we identify a placebo event defined as the stock-day on 
which the same stock has the closest abnormal return to that of the actual analyst recommendation 
change (day 0). We exclude from consideration earnings announcement days and the nine-day 
periods (days t-4 to t+4) surrounding all actual analyst recommendation changes for that stock, to 
avoid overlap with analyst recommendation changes. Placebo events are chosen without 
replacement, so there are no duplicates in the placebo event set. The average absolute difference 
between actual and placebo day-0 abnormal returns is an insignificant 0.0013%, and there is no 
abnormal trading volume before the placebo dates. Table 9 presents the mean abnormal trade 
imbalances for each trader type surrounding the matching-return placebo dates. 
 [Table 9 here] 
The results in Table 9 are consistent with Prediction 4. On the placebo large-return days, 
news-driven institutions simply trade in the direction of the price change on day zero, rather than 
exhibiting “buy the rumor, sell the news” behavior associated with early information acquisition. 
News-driven institutional investors are net buyers rather than sellers on the day of the placebo 
positive returns (Panel A), and they are net sellers rather than buyers on placebo negative-return 
days (Panel B). Furthermore, news-driven institutions do not demonstrate significant buying prior 
to the placebo positive-return days nor significant selling prior to the placebo negative-return days.  
Overall, all three placebo tests show that news-driven institutions trade differently around 
information events when they do not possess short-lived private information. Most notably, the 
imbalance patterns show that both the “buy the rumor” and the “sell the news” patterns of news-
driven institutions are related specifically to analyst recommendation changes, not events such as 
earnings announcements or other large-return days, where early private information is less likely, 
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or reiterations, where information may be less valuable. Taken together, these results reinforce the 
conclusions of our main analysis, linking our findings more clearly to information differences 
between different groups of investors. 
6. Robustness Checks 
We conduct several additional tests to confirm the robustness of our results (results from 
robustness checks are in the internet appendix). First, excluding recommendation changes when 
the same stock has other recommendation changes in the prior four days yields identical inference; 
this filter addresses the concern that what looks like trading before one recommendation change 
could actually be motivated by another recommendation that precedes it. Second, eliminating all 
recommendation changes (for the same stock) that occur within a three-day period does not affect 
the results; this filter addresses the concern that such clustering may reflect news outside the 
recommendation changes themselves.32 Third, excluding recommendation changes that occur on 
dividend announcement dates does not change our results. Fourth, excluding from our sample all 
recommendation changes announced after 4:00 p.m. does not alter our results. Firth, our results 
hold when our sample is divided into sub-periods for before versus after 2007, when Regulation 
National Market System (Reg NMS) and the NYSE’s Hybrid market structure were implemented 
(Hendershott and Moulton, 2011; Chakrabarty and Moulton, 2012). Finally, results are 
qualitatively similar for three- and five-day periods surrounding analyst recommendation changes 
and for trade imbalances scaled by shares outstanding rather than prior-year average daily dollar 
volume.  
                                                            
32 To illustrate the difference between the first two filters, suppose that three analysts all upgrade the same stock, one on each 
day, three days in a row; call them U1, U2, and U3.  Under the first rule, we would exclude recommendation changes when the 
same stock has other recommendation changes in the prior four days: so U2 and U3 are dropped, but U1 remains in the sample.  
Under the second rule, we would exclude all recommendation changes that are clustered within a three-day period (i.e., that have 
other recommendation changes on the day before or day after): so U1, U2, and U3 are all dropped from the sample. 
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In multivariate regressions akin to those in Equation (6), we also test a number of other 
characteristics of recommendation changes, including the firm’s book-to-market ratio, stock 
turnover, the number of analysts covering the firm, and whether the recommendation change is 
accompanied by an earnings forecast, issued by one of the 10 largest brokerages, issued by a 
brokerage firm that has an underwriting relationship with the firm, or occurs after the Global 
Settlement of 2002. None of these variables are found to be significantly related to the strength of 
the “buy the rumor, sell the news” trading activity of news-driven institutions.  
In our study we focus on analyst recommendation changes and so exclude initiations of 
analyst coverage. Thus our results are not directly comparable to those of Irvine et al. (2007), who 
analyze analyst coverage initiations. To reconcile our results with theirs, we repeat our analysis 
for analyst coverage initiations. Using the methodology of Irvine et al., we identify 6,889 analyst 
coverage initiations for NYSE stocks during our sample period. We find that news-driven 
institutions are significant net buyers in the days prior to an analyst’s initial positive 
recommendation, consistent with Irvine et al. and our findings for analyst recommendation 
changes. Also consistent with Irvine et al., but in contrast to our findings for analyst 
recommendation changes, we find no significant net selling by news-driven institutions on the day 
the initial recommendation is announced. Thus, while news-driven institutions appear to be 
contrarians when it comes to positive recommendation changes, this behavior is not observed for 
positive initiations. The differential response of institutions to the announcement of initial positive 
recommendations versus upgrades may be attributable to the magnitude of the price effects. 
Hirshleifer et al. (1994) predict that the magnitude of early-informed buying before and selling the 
day of the announcement are positively related to the strength of the signal, and in our samples the 
average abnormal return is significantly higher on analyst upgrades than on positive analyst 
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initiations. Alternatively, news-driven institutions may not sell the news on positive analyst 
initiations because the initiation-related price increase is due to heightened investor recognition 
rather than new information.   
7. Conclusion  
In this paper we use an unusually comprehensive database to provide an inside look at 
trading in the face of short-lived private information. We examine analyst recommendation 
changes as times when information differences across different types of investors are likely. We 
document how informed investors trade on their short-lived information as well as how differences 
in their trading horizons and motives lead to different profit-taking strategies. We also study how 
uninformed investors trade around these events and how the market is cleared.   
We find that news-driven institutions (who likely receive information early) are significant 
net buyers before analyst upgrades, and they buy more of stocks that ultimately have the biggest 
returns when analyst upgrades are announced. On the day of the upgrade, proprietary (but not 
agency) news-driven institutions trade in the opposite direction, selling upgraded stocks to 
complete the predicted “buy the rumor, sell the news” strategy. In contrast, individuals, who are 
unlikely to be informed early, do not exhibit abnormal trade imbalances before recommendation 
changes, and they buy when the upgrade is announced. Our placebo tests reveal that news-driven 
institutions do not “buy the rumor and sell the news” around events without early information 
acquisition. Finally, we find that program institutional traders are the de-facto liquidity providers 
to news-driven institutional investors, trading in a near mirror image to news-driven institutional 
investors around analyst recommendation changes as they are adversely selected in a winner’s 
curse outcome. In aggregate, there appears to be a transfer of wealth among institutional traders, 
from program traders to news-driven institutions that are informed early.  
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The implications of our analysis are relevant to other situations where some investors have 
short-lived informational advantages. For example, until recently BlackRock regularly gathered 
nonpublic views from analysts through a survey to gain a short-term informational advantage. 
Because of public pressure, BlackRock agreed to stop gathering this information (Morgenson, 
2014). There is also evidence of possible informed trading ahead of macroeconomic news 
announcements (Bernile, Hu, and Tang, 2015; Lucca and Moench, 2015). Recent press reports 
reveal that a number of high-speed traders pay for faster news feeds, giving them a few-second (or 
few-millisecond) advantage over investors who receive news releases through conventional media 
outlets (e.g., Hu, Pan, and Wang, 2014; Mullins et al., 2013; Patterson, 2014). Some news vendors 
have stopped selling direct access to high-speed traders, while regulators are investigating the 
practice and what it means for market fairness. Our findings may be relevant to these situations as 
well, where the timescale is smaller but the underlying principle of early- versus later-informed 
investors is the same.  
   
     
  42 
REFERENCES 
Altinkilic, Oya, and Robert S. Hansen, 2009, On the information role of stock recommendation 
revisions, Journal of Accounting and Economics 48, 17-36. 
Barber, Brad, and Terrence Odean, 2008, All that glitters: The effect of attention and news on the 
buying behavior of individual and institutional investors, Review of Financial Studies 21: 
785-818. 
Bernile, Gennaro, Jianfeng Hu, and Yuehua Tang, 2015, Can information be locked up? 
Informed trading ahead of macro-news announcements, Journal of Financial Economics, 
forthcoming.  
Boehmer, Ekkehart, and Eric Kelley, 2009, Institutional investors and the informational 
efficiency of prices, Review of Financial Studies 22, 3563-3594.  
Bradley, Daniel J., Bradford D. Jordan, and Jay R. Ritter, 2008, Analyst behavior following 
IPOs: the “bubble period” evidence, Review of Financial Studies 21, 101-133.  
Brunnermeier, Markus K, 2005, Information leakage and market efficiency, Review of Financial 
Studies 18, 417-457. 
Busse, Jeffrey A., T. Clifton Green, and Narasimhan Jegadeesh, 2012, Buy-side trades and sell-
side recommendations: interactions and information content, Journal of Financial Markets 
15, 207-232.  
Campbell, John Y., Tarun Ramadorai, and Allie Schwartz, 2009, Caught on tape: institutional 
trading, stock returns, and earnings announcements, Journal of Financial Economics 92, 66-
91. 
Chakrabarty, Bidisha, and Pamela C. Moulton, 2012, Earnings announcements and attention 
constraints: the role of market design, Journal of Accounting and Economics 53, 612-634. 
Christophe, Stephen E., Michael G. Ferri, and Jim Hsieh, 2010, Informed trading before analyst 
downgrades: evidence from short sellers, Journal of Financial Economics 95, 85-106. 
Craig, Susanne, 2009, Goldman’s trading tips reward its biggest clients, Wall Street Journal, 
August 24, 2009.  
Goldstein, Michael A., Paul Irvine, Eugene Kandel, and Zvi Wiener, 2009, Brokerage 
commissions and institutional trading patterns, Review of Financial Studies 22, 5175-5212.  
Harris, Milton, and Artur Raviv, 1993, Differences of opinion make a horse race, Review of 
Financial Studies 6, 473-506.  
Hendershott, Terrence, Dmitry Livdan, and Norman Schürhoff, 2015, Are institutions informed 
about news? Journal of Financial Economics 117, 249-287.  
Hendershott, Terrence, and Pamela C. Moulton, 2011, Automation, speed, and stock market 
quality: the NYSE’s Hybrid, Journal of Financial Markets 14, 568-604. 
     
  43 
Hendershott, Terrence, and Mark S. Seasholes, 2009, Market predictability and non-
informational trading, Working paper.  
Hirshleifer, David, Avanidhar Subrahmanyam, and Sheridan Titman, 1994, Security analysis and 
trading patterns when some investors receive information before others, Journal of 
Finance 49, 1665-1698. 
Holden, Craig W., and Avanidhar Subrahmanyam, 1996, Risk aversion, liquidity, and 
endogenous short horizons, Review of Financial Studies 9, 691-722.  
Hu, Grace Xing, Jun Pan, and Jiang Wang, 2014, Early peek advantage? Working paper.  
Irvine, Paul, Marc Lipson, and Andy Puckett, 2007, Tipping, Review of Financial Studies 20, 
741-768. 
Juergens, Jennifer L., and Laura Lindsey, 2009, Getting out early: an analysis of market making 
activity at the recommending analyst’s firm, Journal of Finance 64, 2327-2359.  
Kadan, Ohad, Leonardo Madureira, Rong Wang, and Tzachi Zach, 2009, Conflicts of interest 
and stock recommendations: the effects of the Global Settlement and related regulations, 
Review of Financial Studies 22, 4189-4217.  
Kaniel, Ron, Gideon Saar, and Sheridan Titman, 2008, Individual investor trading and stock 
returns, Journal of Finance 63, 273-310. 
Kecskes, Ambrus, Roni Michaely, and Kent Womack, 2017, Do earnings estimates add value to 
sell-side analysts' investment recommendations? Forthcoming, Management Science. 
Kim, Yongtae, and Minsup Song, 2015, Management earnings forecasts and value of analyst 
forecast revisions, Management Science 61, 1663-1683. 
Ljunqvist, Alexander, Christopher J. Malloy, and Felicia C. Marston, 2009, Rewriting history, 
Journal of Finance 64, 1935-1960.  
Loh, Roger K., and Rene M. Stulz, 2011, When are analyst recommendation changes influential? 
Review of Financial Studies 24, 593-627. 
Lucca, David O., and Emanuel Moench, 2015, The pre-FOMC announcement drift, Journal of 
Finance 70, 329-371. 
Michaely, Roni, and Kent L. Womack, 1999, Conflicts of interest and the credibility of 
underwriter analyst recommendations, Review of Financial Studies 12, 653-686. 
Morgenson, Gretchen, 2014, BlackRock agrees to stop pursuing nonpublic views, New York 
Times, January 9, 2014. 
Mullins, Brody, Michael Rothfeld, Tom McGinty, and Jenny Strassburg, 2013, Traders pay for 
an early peek at key data, Wall Street Journal, June 13, 2013.  
     
  44 
New York Times, 2002, Merrill fires analyst in disclosure dispute, NewYorkTimes.com, August 
22, 2002, (http://www.nytimes.com/2002/08/22/business/merrill-fires-analyst-in-disclosure-
dispute.html).  
Odean, Terrence, 1998, Are investors reluctant to realize their losses? Journal of Finance 53, 
1775-1798.  
Ortega, Edgar, 2005, Program trades dominate NYSE 18 years after crash: taking stock, 
Bloomberg.com, October19, 2005 
(http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aYWO4jmF79nA).  
Patterson, Scott, 2014, Firms stop giving high-speed traders direct access to releases, Wall Street 
Journal, February 20, 2014.  
Pontiff, Jeffrey, 2006, Costly arbitrage and the myth of idiosyncratic risk, Journal of Accounting 
and Economics 42, 35-52. 
Rock, Kevin, 1986, Why new issues are underpriced, Journal of Financial Economics 15, 187-
212. 
Securities and Exchange Commission, 2012, SEC charges Goldman, Sachs & Co. lacked 
adequate policies and procedures for research “huddles”, Press Release 2012-61.  
Thompson, Samuel, 2011, Simple formulas for standard errors that cluster by both firm and time, 
Journal of Financial Economics 99, 1-10. 
Womack, Kent L., 1996, Do brokerage analysts’ recommendations have investment value? 
Journal of Finance 51, 137-167.  
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
 
 
Panel A: Firms in sample
 Mean Median Std Dev
Market capitalization ($bn) 6.490 1.532 19.277
# Analysts covering 7.1 6.0 4.7
Institutional holdings (%) 66.6 69.4 22.6
Number of firms 2,122
Panel B: Trading volumes by trader type
Volume 
($ billion) % of Total
Volume 
($ billion) % of Total
News-driven Institutional 65,963 67.7%
    Proprietary 8,824 9.1%
    Agency 57,139 58.7%
Program Institutional 21,644 22.2%
    Non-Index-Arb 19,461 20.0%
    Index-Arb 2,183 2.2%
Individual 1,575 1.6%
Market Maker 8,224 8.4%
Total 97,406
Panel C: Recommendation changes by year
Year # Upgrades
Avg Return 
(%) # Downgrades
Avg Return 
(%)
1999 1,151 1.33 1,106 -1.70
2000 386 1.39 598 -1.62
2001 795 1.25 1,050 -1.72
2002 1,194 1.48 2,124 -1.56
2003 1,667 1.99 1,871 -1.63
2004 1,414 1.73 1,437 -1.65
2005 1,328 1.92 1,077 -1.68
2006 1,157 1.96 1,189 -1.62
2007 1,774 2.02 1,476 -1.81
2008 2,016 2.42 1,981 -2.77
2009 1,735 2.72 1,607 -2.08
2010 484 2.00 391 -1.12
Total 15,101 1.96 15,907 -1.83
The sample consists of all domestic common stocks that were traded on the NYSE and had analyst 
recommendation changes between March 8, 1999 and April 22, 2010. Panel A presents descriptive statistics 
for the 2,122 stocks in the sample.  Market capitalization  is calculated annually from CRSP; Number of 
analysts covering ( # Analysts covering ) is calculated annually from I/B/E/S;  Institutional holdings  are 
calculated quarterly as the percentage of shares held by institutional owners from Thompson 13F database. 
All variables in Panel A are averaged for each stock over the sample period, and across-stock statistics are 
reported in Panel A. Panel B reports aggregate trading volumes by trader type for the sample stocks over the 
entire sample period, 1999-2010. Panel C reports separately for  Upgrades  and Downgrades  number of 
analyst recommendation changes in the sample year-by-year and the average abnormal return on the 
recommendation-change day  (Avg Return) , with  Upgrades and Downgrades determined based on a three-
tier scale (buy/hold/sell).  The total number of recommendation changes in the sample is 31,008 (15,101 
upgrades + 15,907 downgrades). 
Upgrades Downgrades
Main Categories Sub-Categories
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Table 2: Analysis of abnormal trading volumes surrounding analyst recommendation changes
Panel A: Mean abnormal trading volumes for analyst upgrades
Day -4 to -1 Day 0 Day +1 to +4 Day -4 to -1 Day 0 Day +1 to +4
News-driven Institutional 38.74 36.73 29.04
(6.7) (19.4) (5.2)
     Proprietary 2.14 2.67 2.07
(3.4) (14.7) (3.8)
     Agency 36.59 34.06 26.97
(6.9) (19.2) (5.2)
Program Institutional 6.68 8.71 10.76
(5.5) (20.4) (9.3)
     Non-Index-Arb 6.24 8.40 10.17
(5.5) (20.8) (9.5)
     Index-Arb 0.44 0.31 0.58
(3.2) (7.1) (4.2)
Individual 1.29 1.26 1.16
(2.5) (8.2) (2.0)
Market Maker 5.83 4.86 4.82
(6.5) (14.4) (6.1)
This table presents mean abnormal trading volume percentages for each trader type in the days surrounding 15,101 analyst 
upgrades (Panel A) and 15,907 analyst downgrades (Panel B). Trading volume is defined as dollar volume of shares bought plus 
sold, scaled by prior year's average daily dollar volume. Abnormal trading volume is the trading volume minus average trading 
volume during the benchmark period (days t-45  to t-11  and days t+11  to t+45  relative to the day of the analyst recommendation 
change). Day 0  is the day the analyst recommendation change is released if before 4:00 pm on a trading day, else the next trading 
day. Day -4 to -1  (Day +1 to +4 ) reflects days -4 to -1 (+1 to +4), with abnormal volume calculated as the sum of the daily 
abnormal volumes over the four days. Means are reported in percentage points, and t -statistics (in parentheses below means) are 
based on standard errors that are double-clustered on stock and date.
Main categories Sub-categories
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Panel B: Mean abnormal trading volumes for analyst downgrades
Day -4 to -1 Day 0 Day +1 to +4 Day -4 to -1 Day 0 Day +1 to +4
News-driven Institutional 59.61 46.18 43.26
(11.5) (18.4) (9.8)
     Proprietary 4.90 3.42 3.89
(7.8) (11.9) (8.1)
     Agency 54.71 42.76 39.37
(11.5) (18.7) (9.6)
Program Institutional 9.38 7.92 11.78
(8.1) (18.5) (9.9)
     Non-Index-Arb 8.85 7.61 11.31
(8.3) (19.1) (10.3)
     Index-Arb 0.53 0.31 0.47
(3.2) (6.0) (3.1)
Individual 2.10 1.35 1.40
(5.9) (10.6) (4.2)
Market Maker 7.53 5.88 5.22
(7.2) (13.7) (5.6)
Main categories Sub-categories
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Table 3: Analysis of abnormal trade imbalances surrounding analyst recommendation changes
Panel A: Mean abnormal trade imbalances for analyst upgrades
Day -4 to -1 Day 0 Day +1 to +4 Day -4 to -1 Day 0 Day +1 to +4
News-driven Institutional 4.26 -1.43 0.33
(4.6) (-3.8) (0.3)
     Proprietary 1.29 -0.70 0.67
(2.5) (-2.7) (1.1)
     Agency 2.97 -0.73 -0.34
(2.1) (-1.3) (-0.2)
Program Institutional -3.62 1.12 -1.55
(-5.5) (4.6) (-2.5)
     Non-Index-Arb -3.31 1.31 -1.23
(-5.5) (5.5) (-2.1)
     Index-Arb -0.32 -0.19 -0.31
(-1.6) (-2.8) (-1.6)
Individual -0.44 0.35 1.03
(-0.7) (1.9) (1.4)
Market Maker -0.20 -0.04 0.19
(-1.7) (-0.5) (1.4)
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
This table presents mean abnormal trade imbalance percentages for each trader type in the days surrounding 15,101 analyst 
upgrades (Panel A) and 15,907 analyst downgrades (Panel B). Trade imbalance is defined as dollar volume of shares bought 
minus sold, scaled by prior year's average daily dollar volume. Abnormal trade imbalance is the trade imbalance minus average 
trade imbalance during the benchmark period (days t-45  to t-11  and days t+11  to t+45  relative to the day of the analyst 
recommendation change). Day 0  is the day the analyst recommendation change is released if before 4:00 pm on a trading day, else 
the next trading day. Day -4 to -1  (Day +1 to +4 ) reflects days -4 to -1 (+1 to +4), with abnormal imbalance calculated as the sum 
of the daily abnormal imbalances over the four days. Means are reported in percentage points, and t -statistics (in parentheses 
below means) are based on standard errors that are double-clustered on stock and date.
Main categories Sub-categories
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Panel B: Mean abnormal trade imbalances for analyst downgrades
Day -4 to -1 Day 0 Day +1 to +4 Day -4 to -1 Day 0 Day +1 to +4
News-driven Institutional -4.37 0.80 0.59
(-4.5) (2.4) (0.5)
     Proprietary -1.70 1.43 1.52
(-2.6) (4.3) (2.0)
     Agency -2.67 -0.63 -0.92
(-2.7) (-1.5) (-1.0)
Program Institutional 3.58 -0.64 -0.08
(4.4) (-2.5) (-0.1)
     Non-Index-Arb 3.72 -0.76 -0.46
(4.8) (-3.1) (-0.6)
     Index-Arb -0.14 0.11 0.38
(-0.7) (1.5) (1.9)
Individual 0.54 -0.10 -0.53
(1.4) (-0.7) (-1.2)
Market Maker 0.24 -0.06 0.02
(0.9) (-0.7) (0.1)
Main categories Sub-categories
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Table 4: Regressions of institutional abnormal trade imbalances on returns
Panel A: Analyst upgrades
Dependent Variable News-driven Institutional Proprietary Agency
Trade Imbalance Trade Imbalance Trade Imbalance
Day -4 to -1 Day -4 to -1 Day -4 to -1
Intercept 3.25 1.02 2.23
(4.1) (2.5) (1.9)
Return day 0 51.26 13.61 37.86
(2.2) (1.0) (2.6)
# Observations 15,101 15,101 15,101
Panel B: Analyst downgrades
Dependent Variable News-driven Institutional Proprietary Agency
Trade Imbalance Trade Imbalance Trade Imbalance
Day -4 to -1 Day -4 to -1 Day -4 to -1
Intercept -3.56 -1.38 -2.18
(-3.3) (-2.2) (-2.1)
Return day 0 44.59 17.44 26.92
(2.4) (1.8) (1.1)
# Observations 15,907 15,907 15,907
This table presents regression analyses of abnormal trade imbalances in the days prior to analyst upgrades (Panel A) 
and downgrades (Panel B). The dependent variable is abnormal trade imbalance for News-driven Institutional 
traders and Proprietary  and Agency  subsets of news-driven institutional traders. Trade imbalance is defined as 
dollar volume of shares bought minus sold, scaled by prior year's average daily dollar volume. Abnormal trade 
imbalance is the trade imbalance minus average trade imbalance during the benchmark period (days t-45  to t-11 
and days t+11  to t+45  relative to the day of the analyst recommendation change). Day 0  is the day the analyst 
recommendation change is released if before 4:00 pm on a trading day, else the next trading day. Day -4 to -1 
reflects days -4 to -1, with abnormal imbalance calculated as the sum of the daily abnormal imbalances over the four 
days. Return day 0  is the abnormal return for the stock on the day of the analyst recommendation change. Parameter 
estimates are reported in percentage points, and t -statistics (in parentheses below parameter estimates) are based on 
standard errors that are double-clustered on stock and date.
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Table 5: Long-run returns after analyst recommendation changes
Panel A: Analyst upgrades
One-day 
Event Return
One-month 
Postevent return
Six-month 
Postevent return
Unweighted 1.87 3.34 6.55
Weighted by news-driven institutional 
abnormal trade imbalances 2.03 5.02 9.39
Panel B: Analyst downgrades
One-day 
Event Return
One-month 
Postevent return
Six-month 
Postevent return
Unweighted -1.68 -1.88 -1.75
Weighted by news-driven institutional 
abnormal trade imbalances -2.04 -2.87 -2.47
This table presents mean size-adjusted returns (as in Womack, 1996) for the day recommendation changes 
are announced and the following one- and six-month windows. Mean returns are calculated both unweighted 
and weighted by the abnormal trade imbalances of news-driven institutions in the four days prior to the 
analyst recommendation change announcement. Panel A presents results for the 15,101 analyst upgrades, 
and Panel B presents results for the 15,907 analyst downgrades. 
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Panel A: Analyst upgrades
Dependent Variable
Day -4 to -1 Day 0 Day +1 to +4
Intercept 1.44 -0.46 0.75
(3.8) (-2.3) (0.3)
All-star analyst 2.58 0.25 2.18
(1.9) (0.2) (1.2)
Small firm 3.09 -0.06 -1.07
(2.1) (-2.8) (-0.3)
Large firm -0.95 1.45 1.61
(-2.4) (1.6) (0.5)
High institutional ownership 0.48 -1.18 1.15
(2.9) (-2.4) (0.4)
Low institutional ownership -4.61 -2.10 -5.60
(-1.3) (-1.0) (-1.6)
High volatility -0.99 0.48 0.96
(-2.9) (2.0) (0.3)
Low volatility -2.95 -0.02 -2.26
(-0.8) (0.0) (-0.7)
# Observations 15,101 15,101 15,101
Table 6: Regressions of institutional abnormal trade imbalances surrounding analyst recommendation changes
This table presents multivariate analyses of abnormal trade imbalances in the days surrounding analyst upgrades (Panel 
A) and downgrades (Panel B). The dependent variable is abnormal trade imbalance for news-driven institutional traders. 
Trade imbalance is defined as dollar volume of shares bought minus sold, scaled by prior year's average daily dollar 
volume. Abnormal trade imbalance is the trade imbalance minus average trade imbalance during the benchmark period 
(days t-45  to t-11  and days t+11  to t+45  relative to the day of the analyst recommendation change). Day 0  is the day 
the analyst recommendation change is released if before 4:00 pm on a trading day, else the next trading day.  Day -4 to -
1  (Day +1 to +4 ) reflects days -4 to -1 (+1 to +4), with abnormal imbalance calculated as the sum of the daily abnormal 
imbalances over the four days.  All-star analyst  is an indicator variable that is equal to one if the analyst making the 
recommendation change is ranked as an all-star analyst by Institutional Investor in the prior year, else zero;   Small firm 
(Large firm)  is an indicator variable that is equal to one if the firm is in the smallest (largest) firm-size quartile, else 
zero;  High institutional ownership  (Low institutional ownership) is an indicator variable that is equal to one if the firm 
is in the highest (lowest) insitutional ownership percentage quartile as of the previous quarter-end, else zero; and   High 
volatility  (Low volatility ) is an indicator variable that is equal to one if the firm is in the highest (lowest) volatility 
quartile as of the previous quarter-end, else zero. Parameter estimates are reported in percentage points, and  t -statistics 
(in parentheses below parameter estimates) are based on standard errors that are double-clustered on stock and date.
News-driven Institutional Trade Imbalance
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Panel B: Analyst downgrades
Dependent Variable
Day -4 to -1 Day 0 Day +1 to +4
Intercept -5.01 0.34 0.36
(-2.8) (1.8) (1.5)
All-star analyst 0.66 1.61 -0.28
(0.3) (1.8) (-0.1)
Small firm -1.93 1.32 0.95
(-2.2) (2.8) (0.3)
Large firm 3.48 -0.57 0.14
(1.7) (-0.7) (0.1)
High institutional ownership -5.01 0.75 2.68
(-3.4) (2.4) (0.9)
Low institutional ownership 5.53 1.83 6.15
(1.5) (1.3) (0.8)
High volatility 1.92 -1.59 -2.90
(2.0) (-3.3) (-1.0)
Low volatility 1.19 -0.15 5.25
(0.5) (-0.2) (1.7)
# Observations 15,907 15,907 15,907
News-driven Institutional Trade Imbalance
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Table 7: Placebo tests of abnormal trade imbalances surrounding analyst recommendation reiterations
Panel A: Mean abnormal trade imbalances for analyst reiterations
Day -4 to -1 Day 0 Day +1 to +4 Day -4 to -1 Day 0 Day +1 to +4
News-driven Institutional -0.20 0.03 -1.18
(-0.2) (0.1) (-1.2)
     Proprietary -0.08 0.08 0.01
(-0.2) (0.6) (0.0)
     Agency -0.12 -0.05 -1.19
(-0.1) (-0.1) (-1.2)
Program Institutional 0.11 -0.02 -0.34
(0.1) (-0.1) (-0.4)
     Non-Index-Arb 0.62 0.14 -0.14
(0.8) (0.7) (-0.2)
     Index-Arb -0.50 -0.16 -0.20
(-1.6) (-1.4) (-0.6)
Individual -0.10 -0.03 0.50
(-0.2) (-0.2) (1.6)
Market Maker 0.19 0.02 1.03
(0.9) (0.2) (1.9)
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
This table presents mean abnormal trade imbalance percentages for each trader type in the days surrounding 17,286 analyst 
recomendation reiterations (Panel A), 4,322 reiterations accompanied by top-quartile abnormal returns (Panel B), and 4,322 
reiterations accompanied by bottom-quartile abnormal returns (Panel C). Trade imbalance is defined as dollar volume of shares 
bought minus sold, scaled by prior year's average daily dollar volume. Abnormal trade imbalance is the trade imbalance minus 
average trade imbalance during the benchmark period (days t-45  to t-11  and days t+11  to t+45  relative to the day of the analyst 
reiteration). Day 0  is the day the analyst recommendation reiteration is released if before 4:00 pm on a trading day, else the next 
trading day. Day -4 to -1  (Day +1 to +4 ) reflects days -4 to -1 (+1 to +4), with abnormal imbalance calculated as the sum of the 
daily abnormal imbalances over the four days. Means are reported in percentage points, and t -statistics (in parentheses below 
means) are based on standard errors that are double-clustered on stock and date.
Main categories Sub-categories
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Panel B: Mean abnormal trade imbalances for analyst reiterations with large positive returns
Day -4 to -1 Day 0 Day +1 to +4 Day -4 to -1 Day 0 Day +1 to +4
News-driven Institutional -0.14 -0.23 0.31
(-0.1) (-0.3) (0.1)
     Proprietary 0.03 0.00 -0.01
(0.0) (0.0) (0.0)
     Agency -0.17 -0.23 0.32
(-0.1) (-0.4) (0.2)
Program Institutional -0.12 0.17 0.45
(-0.1) (0.4) (0.3)
     Non-Index-Arb -0.07 0.14 0.43
(-0.1) (0.3) (0.3)
     Index-Arb -0.05 0.03 0.02
(-0.2) (0.4) (0.1)
Individual 0.13 0.13 0.17
(0.1) (0.3) (0.2)
Market Maker 0.12 -0.07 -0.93
(0.3) (-0.3) (-1.9)
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Panel C: Mean abnormal trade imbalances for analyst reiterations with large negative returns
Day -4 to -1 Day 0 Day +1 to +4 Day -4 to -1 Day 0 Day +1 to +4
News-driven Institutional 0.00 -0.12 0.44
(0.0) (-0.2) (0.2)
     Proprietary -1.26 0.33 -0.19
(-1.3) (0.8) (-0.2)
     Agency 1.26 -0.45 0.63
(0.6) (-0.7) (0.3)
Program Institutional 0.08 0.20 -0.41
(0.1) (0.4) (-0.3)
     Non-Index-Arb 0.09 0.18 -0.38
(0.1) (0.4) (-0.3)
     Index-Arb -0.01 0.02 -0.03
(0.0) (0.2) (-0.1)
Individual -0.09 -0.05 -0.03
(-0.2) (-0.2) (-0.1)
Market Maker 0.00 -0.03 0.01
(0.0) (-0.2) (0.0)
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Main categories Sub-categories
Main categories Sub-categories
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Table 8: Placebo tests of abnormal trade imbalances surrounding earnings announcement days 
Panel A: Mean abnormal trade imbalances for positive-return earnings announcements
Day -4 to -1 Day 0 Day +1 to +4 Day -4 to -1 Day 0 Day +1 to +4
News-driven Institutional -2.85 2.23 2.54
(-0.7) (2.4) (1.3)
     Proprietary -1.21 -0.58 0.05
(-1.3) (-1.5) (0.0)
     Agency -1.64 2.81 2.49
(-0.5) (3.0) (1.3)
Program Institutional 6.66 2.17 2.92
(1.4) (2.8) (1.7)
     Non-Index-Arb 5.88 1.61 3.53
(1.3) (2.2) (2.1)
     Index-Arb 0.78 0.56 -0.61
(1.3) (1.6) (-0.9)
Individual 0.21 -1.03 -1.91
(0.3) (-3.9) (-2.2)
Market Maker -4.03 -3.37 -3.54
(-1.9) (-4.4) (-2.2)
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
This table presents mean abnormal trade imbalance percentages for each trader type in the days surrounding earnings 
announcements with returns similar to upgrade days (Panel A) and downgrade days (Panel B). Trade imbalance is defined as 
dollar volume of shares bought minus sold, scaled by prior year's average daily dollar volume. Abnormal trade imbalance is the 
trade imbalance minus average trade imbalance during the benchmark period (days t-45  to t-11  and days t+11  to t+45  relative to 
the earnings announcement day). Day 0  is the day the earnings announcement is released if the announcement is made before 4:00 
pm on a trading day, else the next trading day. Day -4 to -1  (Day +1 to +4 ) reflects days -4 to -1 (+1 to +4), with abnormal 
imbalance calculated as the sum of the daily abnormal imbalances over the four days. Means are reported in percentage points, 
and t -statistics (in parentheses below means) are based on standard errors that are double-clustered on stock and date.
Main categories Sub-categories
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Panel B: Mean abnormal trade imbalances for negative-return earnings announcements
Day -4 to -1 Day 0 Day +1 to +4 Day -4 to -1 Day 0 Day +1 to +4
News-driven Institutional 1.43 -2.46 1.82
(0.9) (-2.3) (0.6)
     Proprietary -0.41 -0.83 0.96
(-0.5) (-2.3) (1.0)
     Agency 1.84 -1.62 0.86
(1.0) (-1.7) (0.3)
Program Institutional 0.99 0.68 6.36
(0.7) (1.0) (3.7)
     Non-Index-Arb 0.29 1.23 7.87
(0.2) (2.0) (4.7)
     Index-Arb 0.70 -0.55 -1.51
(1.6) (-2.9) (-3.6)
Individual 0.25 -0.42 -2.82
(0.2) (-1.9) (-3.9)
Market Maker -2.67 2.20 -5.35
(-1.4) (1.6) (-1.5)
Main categories Sub-categories
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Table 9: Placebo tests of abnormal trade imbalances surrounding matching-return days 
Panel A: Mean abnormal trade imbalances for positive-return days
Day -4 to -1 Day 0 Day +1 to +4 Day -4 to -1 Day 0 Day +1 to +4
News-driven Institutional 1.00 0.84 0.21
(1.2) (2.8) (0.2)
     Proprietary 0.47 0.17 0.56
(0.8) (1.1) (1.0)
     Agency 0.53 0.67 -0.35
(0.5) (2.1) (-0.3)
Program Institutional -0.80 -0.37 -2.00
(-1.1) (-1.6) (-2.7)
     Non-Index-Arb -0.81 -0.33 -2.01
(-1.1) (-1.5) (-2.8)
     Index-Arb 0.01 -0.04 0.01
(0.0) (-0.7) (0.0)
Individual 0.65 -0.14 0.65
(1.5) (-1.2) (1.2)
Market Maker -0.86 -0.33 1.14
(-1.0) (-1.2) (1.2)
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Main categories Sub-categories
This table presents mean abnormal trade imbalance percentages for each trader type in the days surrounding 15,101 placebo 
positive-return days (Panel A) and 15,907 placebo negative-return days (Panel B). Trade imbalance is defined as dollar volume of 
shares bought minus sold, scaled by prior year's average daily dollar volume. Abnormal trade imbalance is the trade imbalance 
minus average trade imbalance during the benchmark period (days t-45  to t-11  and days t+11  to t+45  relative to the placebo 
day). Day 0  is the placebo day. Day -4 to -1  (Day +1 to +4 ) reflects days -4 to -1 (+1 to +4), with abnormal imbalance calculated 
as the sum of the daily abnormal imbalances over the four days. Means are reported in percentage points, and t -statistics (in 
parentheses below means) are based on standard errors that are double-clustered on stock and date.
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Panel B: Mean abnormal trade imbalances for negative-return days
Day -4 to -1 Day 0 Day +1 to +4 Day -4 to -1 Day 0 Day +1 to +4
News-driven Institutional -1.58 -0.69 -0.80
(-1.0) (-2.6) (-1.0)
     Proprietary -1.03 -0.29 -1.23
(-0.9) (-0.9) (-1.1)
     Agency -0.55 -0.40 0.43
(-0.4) (-1.0) (0.3)
Program Institutional 0.83 0.58 2.04
(1.3) (2.8) (2.8)
     Non-Index-Arb 0.81 0.53 2.04
(1.3) (2.7) (2.9)
     Index-Arb 0.02 0.06 0.00
(0.1) (1.0) (0.0)
Individual 0.05 0.17 0.28
(0.1) (1.3) (0.7)
Market Maker 0.71 -0.06 -1.52
(1.1) (-0.2) (-1.9)
Main categories Sub-categories
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Figure 1: Volumes surrounding analyst upgrades
Figure 1-A: Upgrades -45 days to +45 days
Figure 1-B: Upgrades -5 days to +5 days
Daily Raw Trading Volume  for each stock is defined as trader-type volume scaled by average daily total trading volume in 
prior year. Daily Abnormal Trading Volume  for each stock is equal to Raw Trading Volume minus trader-type Benchmark 
Trading Volume, measured over the period from -45 to -11 and +11 to +45 days relative to each analyst recommendation 
change. Graphs depict averages across 15,101 analyst upgrades from March 10, 1999 to April 22, 2010.  
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Figure 2: Volumes surrounding analyst downgrades
Figure 2-A: Downgrades -45 days to +45 days
Figure 2-B: Downgrades -5 days to +5 days
Daily Raw Trading Volume  for each stock is defined as trader-type volume scaled by average daily total trading volume in 
prior year. Daily Abnormal Trading Volume  for each stock is equal to Raw Trading Volume minus trader-type Benchmark 
Trading Volume, measured over the period from -45 to -11 and +11 to +45 days relative to each analyst recommendation 
change. Graphs depict averages across 15,907 analyst downgrades from March 10, 1999 to April 22, 2010.  
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Figure 3: Imbalances surrounding analyst upgrades
Figure 3-A: Upgrades -45 days to +45 days
Figure 3-B: Upgrades -5 days to +5 days
Daily Raw Trade Imbalance  for each stock is defined as trader-type imbalance scaled by average daily total trading volume in 
prior year. Daily Abnormal Trade Imbalance  for each stock is equal to Raw Trade Imbalance minus trader-type Benchmark 
Trade Imbalance, measured over the period from -45 to -11 and +11 to +45 days relative to each analyst recommendation 
change. Graphs depict averages across 15,101 analyst upgrades from March 10, 1999 to April 22, 2010.  
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Figure 3-C: Upgrade -5 days to +5 days
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Figure 4: Imbalances surrounding analyst downgrades
Figure 4-A: Downgrades -45 days to +45 days
Figure 4-B: Downgrades -5 days to +5 days
Daily Raw Trade Imbalance  for each stock is defined as trader-type imbalance scaled by average daily total trading volume in 
prior year. Daily Abnormal Trade Imbalance  for each stock is equal to Raw Trade Imbalance minus trader-type Benchmark 
Trade Imbalance, measured over the period from -45 to -11 and +11 to +45 days relative to each analyst recommendation 
change. Graphs depict averages across 15,907 analyst downgrades from March 10, 1999 to April 22, 2010.  
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Figure 4-C: Downgrades -5 days to +5 days
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